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Abstract
This thesis documents and analyzes the major trends of the military, political, economic, and
cultural relationships between Denmark and Russia from 1989 to 2019. I document the
relationship from the Danish perspective, using primary sources, with the aim to conduct
analysis of Danish politicians’ speeches and activities during this period. The outcome is a
comprehensive image of the Danish-Russian bilateral relationship at the present time. This
relationship has fluctuated widely during the time period under study. Shared economic
development interests in the 1990s contributed to a positive relationship; controversy
surrounding the war in Chechnya and an assertive Danish prime minister caused a severe
downturn in relations during the 2000s; between 2009 and 2014, Danish economic interests took
top priority and helped salvage the relationship with Russia; but following what the West
perceived as Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014, combined with developments in the
European energy sector, we are now seeing another low period in the Danish-Russian
relationship. The fact that Denmark plays a key role in the linkages between European energy
security and expansion of Russian energy exports, and has through its connection with Greenland
a voice in the issues of sovereignty and access in the Arctic, competition over which is only
going to increase in the coming years, underscores the importance of understanding this
relationship.
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Introduction
In August 2019, American president Donald Trump approached the newly-elected
Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, with a real estate opportunity: he wanted to buy the
autonomous Danish territory of Greenland. Frederiksen was, at the time, visiting Greenland.
“This is an absurd discussion,” she told reporters.1 “I persistently hope that this was not meant
seriously.”2 Trump called her response “nasty”, before lashing out against Denmark on Twitter
and attacking the country’s NATO spending for not being high enough.3 He then canceled his
upcoming state visit to Denmark, planned for the following month. This episode came seemingly
out of nowhere and was widely ridiculed around the world. It also had the potential to be a
confusing case for many casual American onlookers – as a small country, Denmark is often
overlooked on the international stage, especially in the American perspective. However, looking
past the jokes and incredulous reactions that ran rampant following Trump’s proposal, this
episode actually serves as a near-perfect microcosm of Denmark’s bilateral relationship with a
country that was not directly involved in the August drama: Russia.
Greenland, an island of over 800,000 square miles, is a highly strategic chip for
Denmark, which on its own is only around 16,000 square miles. Denmark is also located some
eight hundred miles from the Arctic Circle, while parts of Greenland are themselves located in
the Arctic Circle. Greenland gives Denmark a voice in Arctic issues where it otherwise would
have none. The Arctic is a region with rapidly growing significance to the rest of the world – as
climate change takes its toll on the planet and melts more and more Arctic ice, new shipping
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lanes in the High North and new opportunities for drilling natural gas and oil are opening up.
These openings are of high interest to, among other actors, both the United States and Russia.
Greenland is centrally located within these areas of interest. The territory is also home to a
massive US Air Force base, Thule, and is covered by NATO defense guarantees, due to its
connection to Denmark.
This also makes Greenland, and Denmark by extension, an important piece to the military
armament taking place in the Arctic between the US and Russia. Denmark and the US are
longstanding military allies, and furthermore are inextricably linked by their shared NATO
membership. It is thereby assumed that Denmark’s possession of Greenland (which, again, is
already home to a sizeable US military presence, and has been for decades) is automatically and
already to the benefit of the US. The advantage that Trump perceived in the purchase of
Greenland is, both theoretically and practically, already there and available to the US. The
extension of the offer to buy Greenland clearly indicates that this assessment is not shared by the
American president. Trump does not view Denmark as a reliable strategic ally in this region of
the world, nor does he value strategically the relationship Denmark has with Russia.
Russia also arguably does not assign great strategic value to its relationship with
Denmark. In addition to Denmark’s positioning in Arctic issues, this is also despite Denmark’s
central positioning to the expansion of Russian energy interests in Western Europe. The laying of
the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines on the bottom of the Baltic Sea are perceived
by much of Eastern and Northern Europe to be a massive geopolitical threat, as it will increase
European dependency upon Russian energy resources and decrease European energy security.4
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Denmark chose not to reject Nord Stream and was forced by law to accept Nord Stream 2, but
remains centrally located in this key strategic neighborhood region, in which Russia also has
vital interests and an interest in cooperation.
Between the Arctic and the Baltic, Denmark is a key player in both regions – it still
continues to be undervalued and overlooked by its larger neighbors in these areas, particularly
Russia. The relationship between the two countries has fluctuated significantly over the past
thirty years, since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Tracking and analyzing how a relationship
came to be is essential to understanding new developments within and around the relationship, as
well as how its various components may be deployed or instrumentalized in the future. Outside
of Denmark, and to a certain extent even within Denmark, there is little scholarly work tracing
the real development and evolution of this bilateral relationship. This thesis seeks to do so, with a
perspective situating Denmark at the nexus of collective and energy security in Europe.
Russia is one of the single most influential actors upon collective security, energy
security, and their intersection; despite its tendency to be marginalized in international matters,
Denmark is an influential part of this too. Access by anyone to knowledge about the varying
relationships at play in this region will be instrumental in keeping well-informed, wideperspective diplomacy at the forefront of today’s resurgence of Cold War politics. As military
armament and the race for resources pick up real speed in the Arctic, peaceful international
cooperation and intensive dialogue are going to be of supreme importance to ensure that existing
tensions and power dynamics in mainland Europe do not escalate into something worse in the
High North. The chosen title of this thesis, Tinderbox, draws from a story written by famous
Danish author Hans Christian Andersen and is intended to reflect the propensity for flares in
conflict between Denmark and Russia, given the dynamics mentioned here.

4

This thesis follows a precise structure designed to build out my thematic findings from
my research. The first body chapter reviews relevant events in Danish history from the 19th
century onwards; some of these events take place in the context of Danish-Russian or DanishSoviet relations, but others are limited to Danish experiences. The history chapter lays out the
major foundations upon which the following chapters and insights are based. These are, broadly
stated, Denmark’s historical experiences as a small state surrounded by large neighbors;
Denmark’s transformative experiences with energy insecurity in the 1970s; and the alliance
structures to which Denmark belongs, as well as Russian perceptions of and reactions to these
structures. The literature review follows the history section, as many of the meaningful events
that feature in the reviewed literature require certain historical context, which the history sections
seeks to establish for the reader. The theoretical frameworks discussed, and subsequently the
larger framework that this thesis develops and employs, all work within the broadly stated major
foundations laid out in the history chapter.
Each of the following body chapters focuses on the theme of an individual foundation.
Military relations are the focus of the chapter immediately following the literature review. I find
Denmark’s membership of and commitment to NATO to be a defining pillar of Danish-Russian
relations, due to the opposing strategic aims of NATO and of Russia as unitary military actors;
this incompatibility, combined with Denmark’s key strategic location relative to Russia in the
Baltic Sea, heightens the risk of bilateral conflict catalyzed by the two countries’ military
relationship. There has, however, been meaningful cooperation between the two in this area as
well.
Political relations are the focus of the next chapter, because political opinions about
Russia in Denmark have historically been informed to a high degree by military realities, even
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when these realities did not directly involve Denmark; Denmark is highly pragmatic when it
comes to this area of relations with Russia. Russia’s wars in Chechnya served as turning points
in how Danish politicians perceived and spoke of Russia and its government, and in turn became
the values frame which shaped the Danish side of the political relationship for most of the 2000s.
Increased cooperation between the Danish and Russian economic sectors, specifically
with regards to the energy industry, corresponded to a change in Denmark’s strategic priorities
and perceptions regarding Russia. The economic chapter therefore follows the political chapter.
For approximately a decade bridging the 2000s and 2010s, economic priorities were the guiding
ones on Denmark’s side of the relationship; other political and economic concerns were largely
pushed to the wayside. These concerns were resurrected in the mid-2010s and subsequently
altered economic priorities once more, which brought a return to the colder relationship we see at
the present.
The final body chapter discusses cultural relations, chiefly how Russia appears in Danish
popular media; the intersection of culture, sports, and politics in their relationship; and
concluding with a brief look at Russia’s cultural cooperation mission in Denmark.

Methodology
In this thesis, I will document and analyze the major events, influences, and turning
points in the Danish-Russian relationship across four broad components of the relationship:
military, political, economic, and cultural. I will do so using open-source material, primarily
public statements by Danish officials and archival policy and parliamentary documents from the
Danish government, as well as Danish popular and journalistic media. I analyze discursive
structures and changes over time and work through an individual-based approach to international
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relations. The information gathered primarily focuses on the period of time between 1989 and
2019. My presentation and analysis of this information will create a comprehensive map of how
this relationship evolved from optimistic, values-driven cooperation in the 1990s to a
confrontational, historicized distancing in the 2000s, and from there to the 2010s’ corporatebased artificial peace and subsequent resurrection of Cold War politics.
As a native Danish speaker, all translation of materials has been done myself; this does,
however, limit the scope of my research and my topic to the Danish perspective of this bilateral
relationship. A brief note regarding translation and interpretation concerns Danish naming
conventions – in Denmark, due to a high volume of identical first and last name combinations,
many people utilize their middle name or second surname, such as Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to
distinguish themselves. In Danish, he would be referred to as Rasmussen, or Anders Fogh in a
more casual setting; Fogh Rasmussen would only be used if there were another Rasmussen also
referenced at the same time (for example, in a comparison of Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Lars
Løkke Rasmussen). However, for the greatest ease of reading by a non-Danish audience, in this
thesis I refer where possible to people by their middle and last names (Fogh Rasmussen), as there
are many people referenced in this thesis with the same last names and this method of reference
is least likely to cause confusion.
The bulk of the primary sources utilized in the research for this thesis came from the
Danish parliament’s digital archive, which can be found at the web address ft.dk, and from
archived speeches made by Denmark’s prime ministers, which can largely be found at the web
address stm.dk. The archive contains records, both complete and partial, of parliamentary
debates, legislative proposals and resolutions, and questions posed to ministers by members of
parliament. Part of the analytical value of these records lies in their reflection of not only
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measures that succeeded, but also measures that failed or were revised significantly; all iterations
provide information about discussions and concerns that were had at some point, and therefore
provide a fuller picture than if one were to draw only upon laws that succeeded in passing.
Records of debates, questions to ministers, and prime minister speeches are equally
valuable because they provide much of the human dimension to the foreign policy decisions laid
out by legislation. It is important that foreign policy analysis account for the real personalities
and relationships of the people behind the policies. These more human contexts can be
overlooked with relative ease, but in my view, it is a mistake to do so; I therefore attempt to keep
central the human components of policy formation and diplomacy, wherever possible.
In addition to a range of nonfiction books about broader NATO-Russia and West-Russia
relations written by experts in their respective fields, this thesis draws upon a number of fiction
novels from Danish authors and works of film or television that relate peripherally or
contextually to my primary topic. I already knew of and had consumed many of these works
prior to beginning work on my thesis; therefore, part of my research process involved thinking
back on books I had read or films I had watched out of personal interest in the past, and how they
related either directly to Danish-Russian relations or proximally to context surrounding the
relationship. I am half Danish and, as was mentioned previously in this section, am a native
Danish speaker. These details are key to my research process, as the vast majority of sources for
my research are not currently available in English.
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History and Background
“Life is understood backwards but lived forwards.” - Søren Kierkegaard 5
Contemporary narratives of Danish history often prioritize one year in their stories: 1864.
This was the year that cemented Denmark’s fall from grace as a powerful nation of roving
seafarers that dominated the seas to the north. Some years prior, Denmark and the German
Confederation fought a three-year war from 1848 to 1851 over the territory comprising presentday Denmark’s southern border and Germany’s northern one. This territory, the two duchies of
Schleswig and Holstein, was contested because of the large and mixed populations of both
Germans and Danes that lived here. The war in 1848 was fought for control over SchleswigHolstein and Denmark came out victorious over the secessionists, in part due to the support that
Russia, alongside Britain and France, had offered Denmark against the Prussians. Kiel, a key
gateway port to the Baltic Sea, is located in Holstein and the Russians preferred it to be in
Danish rather than German hands. The 1852 London Accords affirmed the Danish victory, but
also included the condition that neither duchy could be constitutionally linked to the Danish
state.
These seemingly clear legal guidelines were followed closely by the Danish government
for about nine years, until King Christian IX allowed himself to be pressured by the Danish
people into signing the November Constitution of 1863. This constitution was written to include
Schleswig, which also meant that it was written in violation of international law under the 1852
peace accords. The violation gave Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck the opening he
both needed and wanted to declare war on Denmark. The war lasted from Christmas Eve in 1863

5
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until the summer of 1864 – a much quicker affair than the 1848 First Schleswig War, and a much
more brutal one. Aid by Denmark’s allies helped secure its victory in 1851, but this time help
never materialized, despite promises by both Norway and Sweden to send assistance. Denmark
suffered an abysmal defeat at the hands of its stronger southern neighbors and lost forty percent
of its territory, which it never fully regained. Only Northern Schleswig would rejoin the Danish
kingdom after the conclusion of World War I. From 1864 onwards, Denmark was consigned to
almost a century of submission.
The next key part of the story begins on April 9th, 1940. The evening before, Danish
military intelligence on the southern border with Germany reported German military movement
near the border, but it was assumed to be a drill – Denmark had signed a non-aggression pact
with Germany in 1939. Early in the morning of the 9th, it became quickly clear that the German
movements were not a drill; they were war. The Danish troops stationed along the border were
mobilized, but were much weaker than the incoming German troops. Their poor training and
equipment combined with the utter surprise of this unexpected entrance into war and led to the
total capitulation of the Danish state within just a few hours. Denmark remained under the heel
of the Nazis until 1945 and was under direct military occupation from 1943 to 1945, and
although the government pursued a policy of cooperation with the Nazis, Danes were able to
successfully evacuate almost all of the country’s Jews safely to Sweden, as well as carry out a
coordinated resistance movement against the occupying forces.
The British army was responsible for most of Denmark’s liberation in the spring of 1945,
aside from the eastern Danish island of Bornholm. Bornholm was liberated by the Soviet Red
Army at the same time. An internal memo from M. Vetrov, a member of the Soviet foreign
affairs committee, to Vladimir Dekanozov, a deputy foreign minister, on April 2, 1945, laid out
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the importance of Soviet naval forces being the first to liberate and occupy Bornholm, which was
strategically located the furthest east into the Baltic Sea of all of Denmark’s territories. Citing
Denmark’s position as a “guard post” at the juncture between the Baltic and the Atlantic, Vetrov
wrote to his colleague, “On the basis of our occupation of Bornholm, [we should] proceed to the
practical signing of a Soviet-Danish military agreement that gives us unconditional right to
participate with our High Command in the exercise of the highest responsible authority in
Denmark, until a Danish government is formed with the free will of the Danish people.”6
At the same time, Major General Richard Dewing, who was heading up the Allied
mission to Denmark, told army personnel, “Russia is displaying political interests in Denmark,
and we must, in the common areas we have with them, try not to step on their toes.”7
Additionally, miscommunications by a key Danish representative to the Soviet Union, Thomas
Døssing, mistakenly gave the Allies the belief that there existed an agreement between Denmark
and the Soviet Union that the latter could take control of Bornholm.
So, while the rest of Denmark spent May of 1945 celebrating the Allied victory and the
Nazi surrender, Bornholm Danes were having a very different experience. They first suffered an
intensive Soviet bombing campaign that left much of the island in ruin – then they were
forgotten by their countrymen. All told, the Red Army would remain on Bornholm for almost an
entire year after the war ended for everybody else. During this period, Soviet soldiers regularly
raped, assaulted, robbed, and burglarized the people of Bornholm, and there seemed to be very
little recognition of this reality coming from news in mainland Denmark.8 This became a
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politically uncomfortable situation for the Danish government, as time passed and troops of other
foreign nations had already gone home but the Red Army remained.
Finally, the Danish foreign minister Gustav Rasmussen brought the issue up with the
Soviet deputy foreign minister, Andrey Vyshinskyy, when the two met in London in February
1946. “I had said I was convinced that the Soviet Union did not have a hidden agenda towards
Denmark, but had to emphasize that the troops’ recall would remove the last reason for mistrust
of the Soviet Union that the Danish public had,” Rasmussen recounted in his notes of the
meeting.9 Døssing, the Danish envoy to the Soviet Union, finally brought a letter to Soviet
foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov that formally requested a recall of the Soviet troops,
several months later.10 Molotov responded, “If Denmark is prepared to take over the island of
Bornholm with its own troops and set up its own administration, without any participation of
foreign troops and foreign administrators, then the Soviet government will recall its troops from
Bornholm and give the island over to the Danish state.”11 The Red Army went home in the
spring of 1946. Its extended occupation, however, caused uncertainty among the politicians back
in Copenhagen and real trauma among the Bornholm residents who had been forced to live and
deal with these soldiers for so long.
The Cold War era began in Denmark against a backdrop of humiliation from the German
machine in the south and unease towards the Russian bear in the east. Despite the drama that
transpired over Bornholm, Danish-Soviet cooperation continued with relatively few issues after
its resolution. During a meeting between Danish diplomat Nils Svenningsen and Soviet diplomat
Ilya Chernyshov in the spring of 1946, both envoys expressed a mutual interest in continuing

9

Hornemann 2006, p. 323.
Hornemann 2006, p. 336-337.
11
Ibid.
10

12

open conversations about issues concerning both countries.12 Some of the issues that were
brought up in this early meeting – interest in Nordic cooperation, Danish prioritization of the
UN, Danish militarization – were topics of discussion throughout the Cold War, if not beyond.
Danish-Soviet interactions from the 1950s through the 1970s were marked by a variety of
differing tones, but an odd insecurity from the side of the Soviets remained a constant
throughout. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, creating NATO, and this would
quickly and indefinitely become a contentious roadblock in Danish-Soviet relations, as well as
broader West-Soviet/West-Russia relations.
When Danish diplomat Alex Mørch met with Marshal Kirill Moskalenko in 1956, he
noted Moskalenko’s fear of an American-led NATO forcing the European members to commit
troops to an assault on the USSR; this anxiety that Denmark and other European countries could
be forced by NATO to act appeared multiple other times throughout documented diplomatic
interactions during the Cold War.13 There was always the possibility of a crazy adventurer
coming to power in a country and starting a war no one wanted, or so claimed Moskalenko;
although this fear can likely be traced to the USSR’s years under Josef Stalin, there is irony in its
realization again forty years later, when Vladimir Putin first came to power in Russia. The
conversation was characterized by mistrust and suspicion of NATO and Western intentions from
Moskalenko, which led Mørch to conclude his letter with the remark that it was depressing how
misinformed such a highly ranked person had to be in order to believe that the Western countries
were seriously considering an assault on the Soviet Union.14
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However, Denmark’s close cooperation with NATO countries and with West Germany in
particular was concerning to the Soviets, although they did not appear to perceive Denmark as an
important actor in its own right. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was interviewed by Danish
Democracy, a newspaper for members of the conservative political party Venstre’s youth
chapter, in 1958; in his responses, Khrushchev never spoke of Denmark on its own, but only ever
as part of bilateral relations or in a group of other countries, such as NATO or the Scandinavian
countries. In the interview, he doubled down on the earlier strategy of warning Denmark against
the alliances it was choosing – he warned against the creation of a Baltic naval command (which
was eventually created anyway in 1962), missile armament in the Nordics (which was not taking
place), and the militarization of the Baltic region (which was, according to him, being done
against the will of the “peaceful” Scandinavian countries). In his summary of the interview, the
writer for the newspaper emphasized that the interview had not been conducted out of any
support for Khrushchev; that Khrushchev’s perception of the Scandinavian countries as peaceful
was mistaken; and that Soviet threats would not force any of the Nordic countries to “crawl into
a mousehole”.15
In October 1956, a student protest began in Budapest, Hungary, against the Sovietbacked Hungarian People’s Republic. The protest quickly gained traction and turned into a full
revolution that saw huge popular mobilization across the country, mobilization which seemed to
successfully turn the political tides in the country. In November, the Soviet government sent a
large military force to invade the country. Hungarian resistance was able to withstand a week of
brutal fighting before it was finally put down by the Red Army. In Denmark, this event was
regarded with horror and shock. At a meeting in March 1957, a secretary at the Soviet embassy
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to Denmark expressed to Danish diplomat Hans Møller his wish for Danish-Soviet relationships
to become again as good as they had been before the Hungarian Revolution; Møller replied
honestly that, for him, it had been a “very painful and sorrowful experience to see what had
happened in Hungary, and it had made a deep impression on [him] and in fact seriously damaged
[his] otherwise friendly feelings towards the Soviet Union.”16
Likewise, the editor of Khrushchev’s interview with Danish Democracy in 1958 made a
point of bringing up the invasion, which he described as a “murderous assault” intended to
“preserve the [Russian] empire” and which Khrushchev would undoubtedly dismiss as “internal
affairs”.17 Danes were clearly very shaken by this evidence that the Soviet Union was willing to
violently interfere within the borders of other countries, if it believed those countries to be
hosting anti-Soviet behaviors or ideas. The Russian willingness to violate small countries and the
open Danish disgust at such actions will make significant reappearances at later points in their
bilateral relationship.
The following year, when Hungarian Revolution leader Imre Nagy was executed by the
Soviets for his role in the revolution, Danes protested outside of the Soviet embassy in
Copenhagen. The Soviet government organized a revenge protest outside the Danish embassy in
Moscow, in which stones were thrown through the embassy windows and the walls graffitied
with slogans such as “down with Danish puppets”, “down with the warmongers”, and “shame on
the Danish NATO-lackeys”. Soviet authorities denied having played any part in the organization
of the protests (Alex Mørch described the official Soviet response as the type one receives “only
in dictator countries”), and the official Danish position was that the protest had been organized
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without the knowledge or permission of the Soviet government. In his cable from the Moscow
embassy back home to Copenhagen, however, Mørch wrote that the Soviet authorities had,
“without a doubt”, aided the protests. Despite this, he advised that this incident not be interpreted
as “an expression of particular ill will towards Denmark.”18
The 1960s opened with more tension between the USSR and Denmark over Denmark’s
NATO membership. Despite repeated claims by Soviet officials throughout the Cold War period
that the USSR did not fear Denmark, those same officials often had strong reactions to
Denmark’s participation in NATO and support of the West during the Cold War. A NATO drill
called Hold Fast took place around the Danish-West German border in the fall of 1960. Royal
Danish Defense College students participated alongside regular Danish soldiers in the drill;
specifically, students who were studying Russian language at the Defense College were chosen
to act as Soviet prisoners of war. Denmark’s role in Hold Fast, as well as the drill itself, were
eviscerated in the Soviet press; a September 1960 article in the Soviet military newspaper Red
Star called the drill “provocative”, claimed that it painted the USSR as aggressors and justified
support of the “German revanchists”, and pointed to it as proof that alignment with NATO
“pushes small countries like Denmark down a dangerous road”.19
A Soviet embassy representative named Rylnikov took this a step further in his
conversation with the Danish secretary to the prime minister, Helge Hjortdal, and equated
Operation Hold Fast to cooperation with “a potential enemy”.20 In the same meeting, Rylnikov
expressed his concern for how the USSR was perceived in Denmark, due to the Danish media’s
generally unfavorable coverage of the USSR. Hjortdal replied that it was the Danish public’s

18

Mørch 1958.
Adamsen 1960.
20
Hjortdal 1960.
19

16

negative perceptions of the Danish Communist Party (DKP) that were to blame. Relatedly, the
DKP traveled to Moscow in April 1963 to meet with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU), and was given a warm reception, hosted by a number of high-profile members of the
Soviet government.
During the DKP’s “warm and friendly” meeting with two Soviet representatives the next
day, the DKP shared its preference for a neutral, atomic weapon-free Nordic region, including
Denmark; in response, the Soviet representatives said that their government was willing to honor
the territorial integrity of neutral states.21 The unspoken implication of such a statement can be
taken to mean that the Soviet government would only honor the territorial integrity of neutral
states; non-neutral, or aligned, states could reasonably expect the opposite. The implicit threat
here was expanded upon by the Danish ambassador to the Soviet Union, Christian HoltenEggert, when he wrote the Danish foreign minister Per Hækkerup a few days later to summarize
the DKP’s meeting. The Soviet side had mentioned that “Danish-Soviet trade could double, even
triple, if only Denmark itself wanted it to”, but it was implied that such trade growth was
contingent upon Denmark leaving NATO in return.22
Soviet pressure on Denmark to leave NATO intensified in the 1960s and took on a new,
harsher tone. Hækkerup met with Khrushchev towards the end of 1963, and the Soviet Premier
insisted on bringing up the past – when then-Danish Prime Minister H.C. Hansen declined to sell
tankers to the USSR in 1956 – before urging Denmark yet again to leave NATO. Denmark was
supporting aggressive forces, he said, and the USSR did not fear Denmark. Hækkerup responded
that it was the Danish position that “the road to détente goes over agreements between NATO
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and the Warsaw Pact”.23 Khrushchev continued to raise the issue with increasing aggression
during his meetings in 1964 with Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag. At a meeting of the two
leaders in February, Khrushchev accused Denmark of following the American policy line and
discriminating against the USSR, before again bringing up the relationship between Denmark
and West Germany. “I don’t know what tie connects these two countries; it must be like the rope
and the hanged man,” he told Krag.24 A few months later, he told Krag that the USSR could be a
better friend to Denmark than NATO could.25 For such a large country, and one that claimed so
often it did not fear Denmark, Soviet positions towards the smaller country continued to take on
an increasingly defensive, insecure, and oddly paranoid tone. There was not much to be feared
from Denmark by itself, certainly, but the Soviet Union arguably feared the friends Denmark had
made and the capabilities it could gain from these friendships.
However, this is not to say that relations between the two countries in the 1960s were
purely tension-based. Krag was sure to emphasize the goodwill he held towards the Soviet
people, although this could have been careful word choice to avoid expressing goodwill towards
the Soviet state. His conversations with Khrushchev also focused heavily on the trade
relationship between the two countries; Denmark has long prided itself on its agriculture, and its
agricultural goods and knowledge were highly valued trade commodities in the Soviet Union.
Another issue that reappeared multiple times in their meetings was the inability of Soviet citizens
to travel to Denmark to visit family they had there; when Krag brought up the case of a Danish
man who was married to a Soviet woman and wanted his mother-in-law to be able to come and
visit from the Soviet Union, Khrushchev replied jokingly, “That can be allowed. It is very
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seldom that one wishes to be visited by their mother-in-law.”26 The relationship between leaders
appeared to improve a bit when Khrushchev was removed from power in October 1964 and
replaced by a troika of leaders; Alexei Kosygin, who replaced Khrushchev as Premier, was wellregarded by Krag after their initial meetings in October 1965. Despite this, Krag did at one point
during these meetings feel the need to remind Kosygin that Danish territory is not small;
Greenland is Danish, and Denmark will use it.27 This will also reoccur as a key strategic part of
the Danish-Russian relationship further down the road.
In 1972, there was a minor espionage scandal between the two states when Danish
intelligence (PET) caught three Soviet embassy employees engaging in espionage activities in
Denmark. Danish authorities decided against expelling them, for the sake of preserving good
Danish-Soviet relations; however, they did strongly warn the Soviet Union that action would be
taken if there were further Soviet spies caught in the future, and action included reconsidering
the expulsion of the three original spies. They did advise that a voluntary recall was made of the
three diplomats, stating that this would be taken as a mark of goodwill in their bilateral
relationship, and the Soviet government complied. However, the Soviet ambassador, much like
other representatives from his country in decades past, was quite upset about negative Danish
media coverage of the incident. The Soviet government issued a retaliatory request in the
summer of 1972 asking for the voluntary recall of two employees at the Danish embassy in
Moscow, who had allegedly been caught engaging in matters of espionage.28
In the fall of 1973, the Yom-Kippur War broke out, pitting Israel against Egypt and Syria.
As a result, numerous Arab countries increased oil prices to the rest of the world, and in some
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cases decreased their production. The intention was to put pressure on countries that had
expressed support for Israel. Denmark was hit by this sudden shortage as much as any other
country and asked its citizens to limit their oil consumption towards the end of October,
approximately a month after the initial outbreak of war. On November 5th, however, Danish
Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen gave an impromptu speech in the town of Middelfart. In this
speech, he said that he could, “for the most part”, understand and justify “Israel’s aggression”.29
This speech nearly marked Denmark for death, so to speak. Because of this public display of
support for Israel, Denmark ran the risk of being singled out for a complete oil embargo, as had
happened to the Netherlands and the United States. According to the Saudi oil minister during a
private visit to Copenhagen a few weeks later, Denmark had been a mere two votes away from
suffering this outcome.30
The oil never fully stopped flowing to Denmark, but the shortages experienced within the
country and the persistently high prices even after the embargo was lifted were significant
enough that Denmark began to explore the potential for energy supply cooperation with its
Scandinavian neighbors Norway and Sweden. Ultimately this crisis (as well as the ramifications
of the 1979 crisis, when the Iranian Revolution took place) demonstrated to the Danish
government the importance in guaranteeing supply security, moving from imported to national
sources of energy, and shifting from a market-driven energy system to one driven by policy and
planning.31
Neither Oleg Gordievsky’s name nor his exploits during the Cold War receive as much
notoriety as those of other historical figures produced by this period. However, as the highest-
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ranking defector from the Soviet Union, his impact upon the outcome of the Cold War should
not be understated. In 1983, NATO ran a nuclear drill called Able Archer 83. Unfortunately, to
Soviet eyes this drill looked alarmingly like the real thing, and the call was put out to mobilize
the Soviet missile systems and prepare to strike the US.32 The Soviet alert stood down after the
conclusion of the NATO drill; its fearful reaction was never publicly released by the state. The
West, however, was able to learn of the severity of Soviet paranoia because of Oleg Gordievsky.
The former KGB colonel was recruited by MI6, the British intelligence service, in the 1970s to
serve as a double agent against the Soviet Union. Gordievsky was identified as a potential
defector in the 1960s by the Danish intelligence service, PET, while he was living in
Copenhagen on a “diplomatic” posting to Denmark during the course of his KGB work. He grew
disillusioned with the Soviet Union after its brutal repression of the popular uprisings in
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and became a fan of living in Denmark after his initial posting
there.33 PET picked up on this in its monitoring of the Soviet embassy employees and contacted
MI6 to see if they would be willing to do the legwork in recruiting him.
Gordievsky was a valuable double agent for approximately a decade, but his greatest
contribution was his report back to his handlers about the Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83. The
role that information plays in both preventing and leading to conflict is difficult to overstate –
wars often break out because one side lacks adequate information about the intentions or abilities
of the other. The information provided by Gordievsky demonstrated to Western leaders that they
were dealing with a hair-trigger relationship; as the Chief of MI6 Sir John Scarlett said in 2009,
“more confidence developed that the other side was understood, and that helped manage the
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situation and was a key reason why we got to the end [of the conflict] without a blowout”.34 The
good work of PET and the appeal of Denmark to a disenchanted KGB agent were key reasons
for securing that confidence.
The last clash of the Cold War between Denmark and the Soviet Union before the demise
of the latter took place on a stage that was at once deeply symbolic and slightly unexpected – the
soccer field. The Danish men’s national team of the 1980s was dubbed “Danish Dynamite” for
its unprecedented successes on the field and self-deprecating swagger off it. On June 5th, 1985,
Denmark’s Constitution Day, at Idrætsparken (as the stadium was called at the time) in
Copenhagen, the Danish Dynamite squad pulled off a huge underdog victory against the Soviet
Union to qualify for the 1986 World Cup in Mexico. In the days leading up to the match, Danish
newspapers ran pieces with headlines like “WE WILL SKIN THE RUSSIAN BEAR”.35
Denmark had met the Soviets on the field eight previous times and lost each one, giving up thirty
goals along the way.36 This poor record ended in Copenhagen that day – Danish legends Preben
Elkjær and Michael Laudrup scored two goals each to down the Soviet Union 4-2.
This is one of the most legendary games played by one of the most legendary squads in
world soccer history, and the symbolic value on both a sporting and a national level was
immense. Looking back on the match several decades later, Laudrup (who was only 20 at the
time of the match) said, “In my many matches with the national team, there have been big
matches, but the meeting with the Soviet Union 22 years ago remains one of the biggest, because
everything stood for something bigger than itself…It was like winning a World Cup title,
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because it was the Soviet Union itself we knocked down”.37 In 2008, he became the manager of
Spartak Moscow, one of the four Moscow clubs that play in the Russian Premier League, and
told Danish magazine EkstraBladet in an interview that the Russians have not forgotten the
match, but that “the Russians are so happy when I tell them that in Denmark, that match is
counted as one of the three best national team games ever”.38
Of additional interest is that the in-stadium advertising, while mostly for Danish candy
brands and Denmark’s beloved draft beer Carlsberg, included Shell Oil and Danfoss, a Danish
company that produces heating technology and since the 1970s has placed a premium on
optimizing the efficiency of thermoregulation and radiator products. The advertising of each of
these companies at one of the most-viewed Danish sporting events ever is significant especially
given the context of the time period – the oil crises of the 1970s were still fresh memories, and
the reorganization of the Danish energy sector still underway.
By the end of the 1980s and the end of the Soviet Union, a clear picture was emerging of
what Denmark would look like in the years to come. The country went through a little less than a
century of trauma at the hands of its larger neighbors and emerged from the Second World War
as a determined member of NATO and contributor to the efforts of the West throughout the Cold
War. From its experiences with war between 1864 and 1945, Denmark took away the lesson of
the great risks that can easily befall a small country if it does not take care to build strong
alliances and situate itself within a greater coalition. Diplomatic relations between Denmark and
the Soviet Union during the Cold War revealed open and honest, if not always positive,
interactions between representatives of each country. They also cast light on tensions in the
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bilateral relationship that would heavily shape the relationship on both sides during the post-Cold
War period. The energy crises of the 1970s tempered this lesson – overreliance on one country or
region can just as easily hurt a country as isolation can. The goal of self-sufficiency in Danish
energy policy from that point forwards will become a key part of the Denmark-Russia story later
on; however, at the end of the Cold War, Denmark had chosen the surviving side and had taken a
symbolic victory as well over the Soviet Union on the soccer pitch, and it entered into the postSoviet era with confidence in itself and optimism for the new states joining it in Europe.

Literature Review
This thesis will make an argument for the significance of the Danish-Russian relationship
within a broader European context of collective security, energy security, and the overlap
between the two. Denmark’s shared water border with Russia and its location at the center of
Northern, Eastern, and Western Europe place it uniquely in a fairly central role to some of the
largest collective and energy security issues Europe currently faces. However, literature
documenting and analyzing comprehensively the recent development of the two countries’
relationship in the post-Cold War era is lacking. Additionally, Denmark and its role in the
international system is often undervalued in literature originating outside of Denmark or the
larger Scandinavian/Nordic region. This paper seeks to contribute to this gap in the literature and
argue for the relevance of the Danish-Russian relationship to actors outside of Denmark,
including in Russia itself. The rest of this section will review the major themes that frame this
argument and the relevant theoretical frameworks that will be used to advance it.

24

Collective security
Collective security in Europe following World War II was initially manifested by the
opposing security blocs on either side of the Iron Curtain – the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and the Warsaw Pact. The bipolarity of the global threat landscape during
the Cold War meant that countries fell fairly simply into one of three camps, aligning with either
the Western liberal order, the Eastern communist one, or neutral non-alignment. The end of the
Cold War saw the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, comprising the USSR, Albania, Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Romania. The expectation of many former
Warsaw Pact members, especially Russia, was that NATO, too, would dissolve, as there was no
longer a need for its existence. NATO, however, neither shared nor fulfilled this expectation.
Consequently, NATO’s role in a post-Cold War, European Union-adjacent security architecture
has been and still is a hotly debated subject. NATO itself lacks internal consensus about what its
principal role, primary duties, and future expansion policies should be; this makes more difficult
the process of securitization, which can be defined as the justified and urgent response of an
actor to a perceived threat.39
In the EU context, as well, threat construction varies by member state, and this can hinder
a securitizing move in response to Russian activities or behavior. However, worth noting is
Floyd’s argument that collective securitization need not have “unanimous or even majority
support” in order to be just and morally permissible.40 NATO has also had to reorient itself
following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. This reorientation meant a return to a regional
focus upon Europe, as opposed to the organization’s more global strategy in the 2000s of
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focusing upon its borders.41 The willingness of countries to go to war on behalf of certain other
countries, whether due to geographic location, the ability of the threatened country to protect
itself, or other competing interests, is another weakness that Russia continues to highlight
successfully with its challenging behavior in the Baltic Sea Region, which includes Denmark.42
NATO and Russia have always had an inherently flawed relationship. The Warsaw Pact
dissolved alongside the Soviet Union, but NATO continued to function, and indeed expand, after
the Cold War ended. The expectations Russia and NATO have had of each other since 1991 have
never really aligned; they may simply have “fundamentally irreconcilable strategic interests”.43
The Russian feeling of marginalization by the principal actors determining the post-Cold War
security order is argued by a number of Western scholars to have been the primary factor in
Russia’s decision in 2008 to end what George Friedman terms its “long period of irrelevance” by
invading Georgia.44
A defining feature of the Cold War was the arms race – one side, in developing new and
more advanced weaponry, posed a larger threat than before to the other side, which then felt the
need to augment its own security with its own improved weaponry, and so on. This is an
example of the concept known as the security dilemma, which states that “many of the means by
which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others”.45 The liberal
international order after the Cold War was intended to be one in which countries could freely
choose their own alignment and their partners. The failure of the West, however, to take Russia
seriously in the 1990s and better incorporate it into the new structures taking shape helped lay
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part of the foundation upon which the conflicts of the 2000s and 2010s would be built. Both
NATO and the EU eagerly pursued this liberal order, expanding quickly eastward to fulfill the
promise of self-determination that much of Eastern Europe had been denied with the brutal
Soviet repressions of the second half of the 20th century. Russian concerns over NATO’s
intentions, suspicious of its claim to be a purely defensive alliance, flared up again with the
ascension to power of Vladimir Putin, a young new Russian prime minister with a grudge against
the West.
NATO’s expansion is arguably an example of a classic security dilemma. NATO
aspirants hope to gain security with the organization’s expansion; in the case of several Eastern
European countries, this more specifically means safety from Russia. Russia feels increasingly
threatened by NATO and takes steps to make itself more secure, whether through conventional
military armament or illegal acts of aggression taken against its neighbors; the cycle continues.
As a country on the Baltic, Denmark is rather closer to some of these saber-rattling events than
the rest of its Western partners in either NATO or the EU, yet further from the action than the
member states which feel most threatened by Russia, namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Poland. Denmark is geographically well-placed to take part in NATO collective security
initiatives in the region, as well as the integrated EU trade of the Baltic Sea Region. This also
puts it in a spot to act as a bridge for both security and economic concerns of Eastern and
Western members of both treaties.
Trade and conflict
With regards to Denmark and Russia, there are key questions surrounding the effect that
their very limited trade relationship may or may not have upon the quality and standing of their
overall relationship. The consensus of much of the literature on the ties between trade and
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conflict is that trade most often has a tempering effect upon dynamics of conflict between
countries; generally, the more bound up in trade a country is with another, whether directly as
partners or indirectly through mutual partners, the costlier it will be for the countries to break
those ties and go to war. Hegre attempts to find an empirical solution to the question of whether
“trade may increase the risks of conflict if a powerful partner in an asymmetrical relationship
employs the weaker partner’s dependence to obtain political concessions”.46 He ultimately finds,
however, that while trade in a symmetric dyad decreases the propensity for conflict, there is no
empirical evidence indicating that an asymmetric dyad is at greater risk of entering into conflict.
Similarly, Kinne finds that asymmetric trade is strongly correlated with centrality
(defined by Kinne as a measure of trade integration based on the breadth and strength of a state’s
trade ties); the more asymmetric trade relationships a state is a part of, the greater the constraints
upon it and the less likely it is to pursue conflictual behavior.47 In the case of Russia, however, it
is the main trade partner of countries in what it considers to be the Russian sphere of influence
(primarily the former Soviet Union). Due to the obvious size discrepancies between Russia and
its small neighboring countries, there is a significant degree of asymmetry inherent to these trade
relationships that does not prevent Russia from provoking conflict with these countries. Kinne’s
finding appears therefore to apply to the smaller partner in an asymmetric trade relationship.
As will be explored later in this paper, Denmark used its trade ties to Russia in 2009 to
salvage what had been a broken, negative relationship for the better part of the decade, when it
accepted Russia’s bid to route the Nord Stream gas pipeline from northwestern Russia to
northern Germany through Danish waters. This highly significant deepening of otherwise
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negligible trade ties between the two countries did decrease the likelihood of conflict in their
relationship in the short term, but had larger implications in the area of energy security.
Energy
Energy security is a highly ambiguous concept, the focus and emphasis of which change
easily according to the intent with which the concept is being deployed. I will be primarily using
Kalicki and Goldwin’s definition of energy security, “the assurance of the ability to access the
energy resources required for the continued development of national power,” with the qualifier
that the assurance of ability for access comes free of political influence by external actors.48
Europe’s growing dependency upon Russian energy supplies is widely considered to be a threat
to European security and political sovereignty. Russia has made no secret of its willingness to
shut off the gas flow to some of its energy partners in Eastern Europe over the last fifteen years
or so alone, but there is disagreement over whether Russia would take these same steps against
Western European partners, were it to increase its leverage over them through increasing gas
deliveries.
Although Russia is also a major exporter of oil, the methods of transporting gas (pipeline)
versus oil (barrels) make the gas market easier for creating asymmetries of structure, and thus of
power.49 Nygård finds that Russia has both the will and the way to wield gas as an instrument of
foreign policy against Western Europe, as it does in Eastern Europe. Despite this, because Russia
depends on the income from higher gas prices in Western Europe, it is unlikely to shut off the
gas to the West. However, the EU’s gas production is falling, and consequently it will need to
import more gas over the coming decades, as renewable energy sources are not yet ready to play
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a competitive role for much of Europe. Echoing Nygård, Paillard argues that “Russia has the
means and the political will to create new routes and to make countries favorably disposed to its
economic and political interests, regardless of European policy,” while also recognizing that
Russia and Europe will need each other to stay above water for the next few decades at least. 50
Paillard recommends that reorganization of European gas industries and development of
liquefied natural gas (LNG) capabilities take place to diversify European supply security and to
counteract the Russian strategic aim of driving a wedge between Europe and the US, a major
LNG exporter. Indeed, energy transit is the major determinant of the degree to which energy
exports can be used as tools of foreign policy and influence by the exporter. For most of Europe,
receiving LNG entails the building of new infrastructure and/or upgrading of existing
infrastructure; the prohibitive costs associated mean that LNG has yet to become a truly
competitive option in Europe.51
Additionally, the greatly varying and inconsistent gas risk exposure across EU member
states means that a one-size-fits-all EU energy security policy would be extremely difficult to
achieve.52 There are competing northern and southern strategies within the European energy
market, and energy security means something different for West and East-Central Europe
respectively.53 This paper situates Denmark in the uncertain spot of bridging both Western and
Eastern-Central European energy needs, and argues that using this perception of Denmark’s
positioning in European energy security architecture can help to explain inconsistent Danish
policies implemented in the past thirty years. Additionally, Denmark’s heavy investment into its
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own renewable energy sector since the 1970s confirms Rickli’s conclusion that investment by
small states into clean technology makes them more energy secure by reducing their
vulnerability to outside pressures.54
Danish Policy
The most important theoretical concepts to understand before studying Danish foreign
policy revolve around the formation of the small state mentality and its operationalization in both
political and public discourses. Due to Denmark’s relatively recent historical experiences with
larger neighbors, explained in the earlier history section of this paper, Danish politics after the
end of the Cold War continue to use the framework of these historical lessons and to apply them
to experiences of the Cold War. Mouritzen and Runge Olesen categorize possible types of
historical lessons as internalized or instrumental, and develop a luxury theory to explain the
impact a state’s freedom of action has upon the deployment of past geopolitics in contemporary
political decisions.55 This idea was expanded upon in a later argument that the assertive Danish
attitude towards Russia of the 2000s could be attributed largely to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the
Danish prime minister from 2001 to 2009, and his personal internalization of his country’s past
geopolitics.56 To this end, Farbøl identifies three types of narratives prevalent in Danish
discourse (conflict, consensus, and protest narratives), using historicizations of Danish Cold War
history, and explains their application by various Danish political figures, including Fogh
Rasmussen, during major foreign policy events post-Cold War.57
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This historicization of Danish Cold War history was also found to have influenced and be
further influenced by Denmark’s shift from active internationalism to international activism,
which was in part catalyzed by Denmark’s larger allies (namely the US).58 Active
internationalism refers to an activist, multilateral tradition of Danish foreign policy from the
1980s through 2001, which sought primarily to preserve a balanced order in Denmark’s
neighborhood.59 International activism refers to the post-2001 shift in Danish foreign policy,
which instead prioritized bilateral relations and greater self-assertion.60 These narrative
frameworks in turn shaped Danish perceptions of Russian leaders and actions in the same time
period, leading to overwhelmingly negative media coverage in Denmark of Russia during the
2000s and 2010s.61 Outside of discourse, Denmark’s strong support of NATO and skepticism
towards the EU, already covered in the earlier section on collective security, came from these
utilizations of past geopolitics; similarly, Denmark’s active role in developing its neighbors in
the Baltic Sea Region does as well. Building up the Baltic countries helps Denmark provide a
buffer zone between itself and a potentially aggressive Russia. Such aid also wins it friends in
regional fora intended to deal with Baltic Sea Region issues.

Military Relations
The Berlin Wall, separating East Germany from West Germany, and the communist
Eastern bloc from the capitalist Western one, came down in the fall of 1989; Lars Løkke
Rasmussen, who would become the prime minister of Denmark twenty years later, was there
with his wife when it did. It marked the real emergence of a new Europe that had already started
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to take shape with the popular uprisings against communism in the preceding decades, and that
would crystallize two years later with the breakup of the Soviet Union. One of fifteen former
Soviet republics, the new Russian state thought that the new order in Europe was up for debate.
Those in the West, primarily those aligned with NATO, did not.
Denmark had placed itself firmly in the NATO camp forty years earlier. The prime
minister in 1989, Poul Schlüter (Conservative/Konservative, K), told Danes in his New Year’s
Eve address of that year, “The cohesion in the western, democratic world’s defense alliance has
been one of the essential prerequisites for the world now looking lighter than it was a few years
ago.”62 The following year, in his speech at the opening of the 1990-91 session of the parliament,
he called upon his country to make its influence in the world count – small countries needed to
take responsibility for the direction of the world and of Europe.63 NATO was, for Denmark, the
primary frame that would allow it to do so.
Denmark had learned during and leading up to World War II that it did not stand much
of a fighting chance without a reliable alliance of friends around it, and during the Cold War it
sought to cement its place in NATO as a valued and contributive member. Now, entering the
1990s and exiting the bipolarity of the Cold War threat landscape, it was unclear what NATO’s
existential purpose was now. Despite this ambiguity, Danish leadership continued to throw its
support behind NATO throughout the 1990s. It was suggested in the early 1990s that Danish
soldiers should be deployed to the former Soviet Union and provide assistance;64 this was
perhaps in light of the vicious civil war that had broken out in Yugoslavia, and of the Russian
troops lingering in the Baltic countries even after they had achieved independence from the
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Soviet Union. Schlüter’s conservative government was replaced by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s
left-leaning one in January 1993, but the rhetoric at the highest level didn’t change.
Throughout the mid-90s, Nyrup Rasmussen (Social Democrats/Socialdemokratiet, S)
continued to utilize the same rhetoric placing NATO at the center of the security architecture for
Denmark and for Europe, as well as advocating for NATO’s expansion eastward. At the
parliamentary level, there was less unity about the wisdom of further expansion of the military
alliance. In January 1994, Nyrup Rasmussen’s minister of defense, Hans Hækkerup (S),
allegedly threatened a new Cold War with Russia; the rapid responses by Nyrup Rasmussen and
his foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen (Danish Social Liberal Party/Radikale Venstre, RV)
in denial of the threat are clear, even if the content of the supposed threat itself is not.65 Over the
next few years, members of parliament (MPs) belonging to both sides of the political spectrum
questioned the effect of NATO expansion upon Russia’s respective relationships with Denmark,
Europe, and the West.
The Danish leadership continued to express support for the alliance’s expansion in the
face of rejection of this idea by the Russian leadership. In the aftermath of the Cold War,
nominally no state was supposed to hold sway over how another state chose to align or which
friends it chose to make; this does not, however, change the fact that Russia was signaling its
discomfort with a close proximity to NATO, and these signals were ignored or not properly
addressed. Danish experts argued at the time that NATO expansion risked stalling the
demilitarization of the Baltic Sea region and of the Russian Kaliningrad region (bordering
Poland and Lithuania), and in doing so risk isolating Russia and excluding it from European
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security structures.66 NATO expansion further ran the risk of pushing Russia to withdraw from
the START agreement, which both reduced and limited strategic offensive weapons. For the
West, this would represent a lost opportunity to gain influence over Russian nuclear policy.
In 1992, the small southern Russian region of Chechnya formally broke away from the
Russian Federation and became the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Because of its
significant strategic and symbolic importance to the Russian leadership, then-Russian president
Boris Yeltsin pushed back on the secession by supporting opposition forces in the small-scale
civil war that broke out in Chechnya. The Russian military invaded in December 1994,
apparently to restore order. This was the start of the First Chechen War, which lasted just under
two years, and killed an estimated 18,500 to 80,000 Chechen civilians and 4,000 Russian
soldiers, up to half of whom are believed to have been killed in just the first few days of
fighting.67
The effects of the Russian forces’ brutality upon Russia’s and Yeltsin’s reputations
among the international community and other Russian republics were strongly negative. In
Denmark, support lay behind a political solution to the conflict. Shortly before the Russian
military cut its losses and withdrew from Chechnya in August 1996, Danish MP Holger K.
Nielsen (S) called upon his government to take responsibility and pressure the Russian
government, adding, “It’s embarrassing that the West has not placed greater pressure on the
Russian government around the conflict in Chechnya. The conflict will be resolved not through
Russian chauvinism and massive bombardments, but through political negotiations alone.”68 The
actions of the Russian military were concerning in the West and did little to ease Western doubts
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about whether the new Russian state was truly on the path towards democracy. Military
intervention was never considered an option in Denmark, though, despite disgust over the reports
of high casualties and brutality coming out of Chechnya. Peace temporarily came to Chechnya
soon after, with the signing of the Khasavyourt peace accord on August 31, 1996.
The Danish Defense Ministry periodically tasks a Defense Commission
(Forsvarskommissionen) with investigating and identifying potential threats or challenges that
the country may be facing in the years to come, and then publishing a report summarizing the
challenges and recommendations for the next defense mandate. The 1997 Defense Commission’s
report, which was titled The defense of the future and released in 1998, established the concept of
indirect security as a key one to the defense of Denmark’s interests going forward. Some of the
core ideas behind this concept had already entered into practice in Danish foreign and economic
policy earlier in the decade; this will be covered in later chapters. “Indirect security is, in its
current scope, of qualitatively new meaning for Denmark. Denmark has engaged itself in a
number of military assignments – most clearly in the former Yugoslavia – that in no way appear
to pose a direct threat for Denmark. This is primarily because Denmark has a fundamental
interest in the stability of the order which was established after the end of the Cold War, in that it
gives a – historically speaking – exceptionally high degree of security,” the report reads.69
This concept helped bring Denmark’s military into contact with Russian forces during the
1990s, as the report cited – Danish troops joined the UN peacekeeping efforts in the former
Yugoslavia (primarily Croatia and Bosnia, at first) from 1993 to 2003. The political and military
turmoil at home prevented Russia as a state actor from taking too active a role in the first wave
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of the Yugoslav Wars (1991-95), but a large number of Russian volunteers and mercenaries took
part in the fighting on the ground during this time. Russia had, however, opposed a NATO
bombing campaign in the Balkans at this time, mostly because it viewed such a NATO
engagement in the heart of Europe a concerning precedent to set before Russia and the United
States had had the opportunity to reconcile and clarify their new strategic relationship.70
Only a few years passed before war broke out again in the former Yugoslavia, this time
in Kosovo in the summer of 1998 when Serbian government forces clashed with Kosovan
students. Kosovo sought independence from Serbia; Serbia sought to hold on to Kosovo, for
historically symbolic reasons. NATO established a Kosovo Force (KFOR) in June 1999, and less
than a week later the Danish parliament resolved to deploy Danish soldiers in support of
KFOR.71 In February of that year, Danish MPs belonging to the Socialist People’s Party
(Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF) had asked that Nyrup Rasmussen’s government, among other things,
ensure that future out-of-area operations by NATO only take place if the UNSC had issued a
mandate.72 Nyrup Rasmussen chose to remain in line with his active foreign policy. A month
later, NATO began its three-month bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. These three months
were NATO’s first offensive war, contrasting with its perennially stated purpose of being a
purely defensive alliance, and they took place without a true legal justification by the UN
Security Council.
This was because of Russia – on the same grounds that Russia had opposed NATO action
in the mid-90s, it was again arguing that “the aggressive military action unleashed by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against a sovereign State was a real threat to international
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peace and security, and grossly violated the key provisions of the United Nations Charter”.73
Kosovo, as would be demonstrated several times over in years to come, also has a special
significance for Russia; its relationship to Serbia can represent a sort of analog to what Chechnya
is to Russia. A successful intervention by foreign powers on behalf of Kosovo, and subsequent
independence, set a potentially dangerous precedent for future developments in the Chechen bid
for independence. The NATO intervention in Kosovo was a watershed moment in post-Cold War
Europe and in the formation of West-Russia relations, and Denmark was a participant, despite
lacking political consensus at home about the intervention.
While these incompatible expectations were playing out at a very international level,
Denmark was also facing post-war military reorientation at home, in the Baltic Sea region.
Perhaps naturally, due to the region being Denmark’s home neighborhood, history played a
larger role in military matters here than elsewhere. Peter Skaarup, an MP belonging to the
Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), asked foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen in
April 1998 about an alleged long-standing agreement with Russia that no foreign troops be
allowed on the island of Bornholm, made after the Soviet Union agreed to leave the island again
in 1946. Helveg Petersen denied that such an agreement had ever existed and added, “The end of
the Cold War has fundamentally changed the security policy relationships in the Baltic Sea
region. Changing Danish governments have continually emphasized a contribution to détente in
that part of Europe. This has over time come to express itself in different ways, including
through limitations on military activity in concrete situations.”74
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However, Skaarup appears to either have been truly convinced of this agreement’s
existence, or truly determined to stir up trouble in the parliament; either way, he asked the same
question to Helveg Petersen three additional times over the following year.75 It is not fully clear
from the questions what the source of Skaarup’s concern was, but his insistence on the
agreement’s existence (based upon a claim by Russian ambassador Alexander Chepurin)
seemingly indicates at the very least a general anxiety that Russia could still be wielding
influence over Danish military alignment and geostrategic interests.
At the same time, certain quarters of Danish politics were voicing their opposition to
NATO expansion to the east, specifically to the Baltic countries. They feared consequences
ranging from the halting of Russia’s nuclear disarmament to the spread of nationalism within
Russia itself.76 Nyrup Rasmussen did not share their concerns. He continued throughout the late
1990s to advocate for EU and NATO expansion to Central and Eastern Europe, particularly to
the three Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Regarding NATO expansion, he said
that its door to new members must continue to be held open;77 regarding EU expansion, he went
as far as to assert that the EU, rather than NATO, was “the only way” to peace and security in
Europe, so that it could anchor the new democracies forming in Eastern and Central Europe.78
Poland became a NATO member in March 1999, and the Baltic countries joined five
years later in March 2004, becoming the first (and remain, as of May 2020, the only) former
Soviet states to join the organization. Denmark’s strategic plan for the Baltic Sea Region at the
close of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, therefore, was to aid in the military linkage of the
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Baltic countries to NATO, prior to their actual accession to the treaty. From 1962 to 2002,
NATO’s multinational Baltic command (BALTAP) was based out of Karup, in central Jylland
(the Danish peninsula). Hans Hækkerup, the defense minister who had previously suggested a
new cold war with Russia, suggested now that this command be used to help implement the
Partnership for Peace (PFP) program.
PFP is intended to be a trust-building measure between NATO members and nonmembers in the rest of Europe, including both those who do and do not aspire to eventual NATO
membership. Poland and the Baltic countries were all PFP members prior to their NATO
accession; Russia itself is a member and has been since June 1994.79 However, fears in some
sectors over creating too polarizing a security climate in the Baltic Sea region found controversy
here as well. Keld Albrechtsen, an MP who represented the far-left socialist party Unity List
(Enhedslisten, EL), was responsible for voicing some of the warier viewpoints towards the new
post-Cold War order throughout the 1990s. Albrechtsen accused Hækkerup of trying to backdoor
Sweden and Finland into NATO while also moving NATO closer to Russian borders, all under
the pretext of peacekeeping exercises and operations in the Baltic Sea region.80 Albrechtsen
feared that Denmark’s posturing in the region, and its role in linking the Baltic countries even
further to NATO, would be interpreted as “aggressive and Russia-hostile”.81
BALTAP was phased out in the early 2000s, and was for all intents and purposes
succeeded by the Multinational Corps Northeast, set up as a joint German-Danish-Polish
command in 1999 at Szczecin in northwestern Poland. Albrechtsen, joined by his Unity List
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colleague Søren Søndergaard, later called the establishment of this corps, as well as the PFP
program, “poison for a general détente in all of Europe, and [they] are seen by Russia as a
military encirclement of Russia”.82 Nyrup Rasmussen continued to speak on the importance of
increased Danish presence at the international level, and also contributed significant Danish
support towards the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE.
In the spring of 1999, Copenhagen hosted the Conference on Regional Cooperation in an
Enlarged Europe. At the opening of the conference, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen took the opportunity
to mention the experiences of the Nordic and Baltic countries in having learned to live with big
neighbors; this, he said, was a convincing argument in favor of regional cooperation.83 Russia
was clearly one of these big neighbors, for both of these regions. Regional security was
becoming a topic of increasing significance to Danish leadership at the close of the 1990s; in
terms of ongoing conflicts, Russia was also considered by Denmark to be an important force in
ensuring regional peace in Kosovo, still playing out at the time. In this same speech, Nyrup
Rasmussen stressed the Danish commitment to deploying soft security – preventive diplomacy
and long-term cooperation – alongside the military focus of hard security, which he found to be a
reductive view of security as a concept. He also cited the EU as the “key player” in European
security.
However, when the Treaty on the European Union was ratified seven years earlier in
Maastricht, referendum results in Denmark only allowed the country to ratify the treaty and thus
its EU membership with four reservations, or opt-outs. One of these was the defense opt-out,
meaning Denmark cannot participate in common EU defense efforts. In May of 1999, Nyrup
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Rasmussen defended this reservation as a Danish rejection of the construction of a common
European defense in competition with NATO and outside of NATO.84 The OSCE and UN were
also named essential security actors. Regardless of what Nyrup Rasmussen’s true feelings were
about what role the EU should play in European security, the defense opt-out rendered any of
that irrelevant. Denmark now had to put all its stock into the other available actors. With the
Russian bombing of Chechnya in August 1999 and re-invasion in October, this most
immediately became the OSCE.
In the intervening years between the end of the First Chechen War in 1996 and the
beginning of the Second Chechen War in 1999, power vacuum conditions in Chechnya gave rise
to armed struggles between competing warlords. Violence and crime proliferated in the small
republic and spilled over into neighboring Dagestan with the month-long Dagestan War in
August 1999. Vladimir Putin, at the time virtually unknown across the country, was named
President Yeltsin’s prime minister and eventual successor as president almost immediately prior
to the outbreak of this war. Then, over a two-week period in September, Russia “was hit by a
series of bomb attacks that blew apart mostly suburban apartment blocks, claiming the lives of
305 and injuring over 1,000 in Moscow and the provincial cities of Volgodonsk and
Buynaksk”.85 The Russian government blamed the attacks on Chechen terrorists; however, a
number of eyewitness accounts and journalists connected the attacks to the FSB, Russia’s
security service.86
There are two primary lines of reasoning for the outbreak of the Second Chechen War,
the events of which gave Putin high visibility and allowed him to prove his strength to the
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country. The first is the official Russian version of events, which argues that federal troops were
fighting to restore constitutional order in the North Caucasus and prevent a spiral of violence
from reaching other republics of the Russian Federation. The second is that Chechnya became a
scapegoat and foundational brick in the rise to power of an unpopular new prime minister. Either
way, the new war was a brutal one from the outset – the Chechen capital Grozny was seized and
essentially leveled by February 2000. The international community was quick to condemn Boris
Yeltsin and his military.
The OSCE held a summit in Istanbul in November 1999. Helle Degn, a Danish social
democrat who had served as the Vice President of the Organization from 1994-98 and was now
serving as the president of the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly, gave an address in which she
identified the conflicts in Chechnya and in Nagorno-Karabakh (a disputed territory between
Armenia and Azerbaijan) as proof of the fragility of peace in Europe.87 This detail is of note
because it reflects a larger Danish acceptance of the North and South Caucasus regions, the latter
of which also includes Georgia, as part of Europe. This acceptance is not shared throughout all of
Western Europe or by Russia, and the debate has significant implications upon the areas of
operation for NATO, the EU, and the OSCE itself. In his own address to the summit, Nyrup
Rasmussen stated, “Russia is an invaluable partner in European security. We reaffirm our
position on the territorial integrity of Russia. And there should be no doubt about our attitude to
terrorism. But we also call on Russia to redress the tragic situation in Chechnya without
delay…What we see and hear about the military activity, is completely out of proportions.”88 He
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was one of a number of other Western leaders to openly criticize the actions of Russian troops in
Chechnya at the summit.
Yeltsin responded forcefully. “You have no right to criticize Russia over Chechnya,” he
argued. “I am convinced that stability and security in Europe cannot be considered without
taking Russia into account…We all already know to what disproportionate consequences
[humanitarian] intervention can lead – suffice to recall USA-led NATO aggression against
Yugoslavia.”89 He accused the other members of the OSCE of “mutual recriminations and
moralizing”, and then stormed out of the summit early. Russia saw Chechnya as its right to selfassertion as a security actor. The statements made by Danish representatives at this time
reiterated the value they saw in Russia as a security actor, but Chechnya was viewed as a security
threat and a red flag for Russian participation in the European security order.
Between Chechnya and 9/11, the military component of Denmark’s relationship with
Russia also concerned a large part of the Danish kingdom itself – Greenland. Although
autonomous and practicing limited self-government, Greenland has indeed been a part of the
Danish kingdom since the early nineteenth century. Its large size and proximity to the Arctic
have given it high strategic significance to Denmark and in turn granted greater strategic
importance to Denmark in the eyes of larger powers. Since World War II, Greenland has been
home to a sizeable American military presence, following an agreement by a rogue Danish
diplomat with the US government.90 Today, the US Air Force’s Thule base in northern
Greenland is the main military fixture on the island.
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In the 1990s, this translated to concerns that Denmark and Greenland, especially the
Greenlandic people, would be dragged into a US-Russia arms race. The advanced radar
capabilities at Thule meant that if the US decided to build out its arsenal of nuclear weapons to
eliminate the Russian missile threat, Greenland would immediately gain immense military
strategic value. Keld Albrechtsen argued in parliament that Greenland risked becoming a hostage
in a conflict between NATO and the US on one side and Russia on the other, without any regard
to the actual wishes of either Greenland’s elected politicians or population.91 This mirrored
Danish and Greenland concerns twenty years later, when Donald Trump tried to buy Greenland
from Denmark without any consideration for, among many other things, the population of 56,000
living in the territory.
The Danish-American friendship and military cooperation in Greenland often led to more
concerns in Denmark than were caused by Russian activities in the region. In the fall of 1999, the
US was considering upgrading its missile defense, which included modernizing the Thule base –
such upgrades would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, to which the US was a
signatory. Violating the treaty provoked a sharp response from Russia. Holger K. Nielsen told
foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen that the American recognition of its treaty violation “was
in itself deeply problematic, but it will put the Danish government under pressure.”92 Helveg
Petersen clarified that the US and Russia had agreed to make an exception or adaption to the
treaty. Nielsen was also, however, concerned over the “growing tendency [in the US] towards
apathy about international agreements, a tendency to want to do things themselves”.93
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Albrechtsen also continued to be critical of his government’s partisan role in international
conflicts. “We live in an illusion if we here in the West imagine that Western great powers can
have a monopoly on interpreting international law, but, say, China and Russia cannot,” he
argued. “If NATO and the EU, in the years to come, reserve for themselves the right to decide
when and where there must be military interventions, then it has been opened up for other
countries to do the same.”94
One of the many things altered by September 11, 2001, was the short-term relationship
between Russia and the West. Putin was very quick in reaching out to Bush to express his
sympathy and offer Russia’s concrete support to the US in the immediate aftermath of 9/11,
building on support he had already been offering to the West in fighting terrorism since his
ascension to power.95 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen was also supportive of the US, of working with
Russia against terrorism, and of the idea that 9/11 could bring together old enemies.96 The war in
Chechnya was still ongoing – this was precisely why Putin was so committed to establishing
terrorism as a common cause against which the US and Europe, including Russia, could unite.
Chechen terrorism – or, according to critics of the Russian government, allegedly Chechen
terrorism – was still being used to justify the war in Chechnya. Putin hoped to swap out the
West’s criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya for sympathy and support, by successfully
demonstrating that Chechen Islamic terrorism plagued Russia just as much as Middle Eastern
Islamic terrorism plagued the US.
This succeeded to a limited extent in Denmark, causing a paradoxical situation wherein
the Danish parliament and government continued to condemn Russian human rights abuses in
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Chechnya, yet in the case of the government refused to raise the issue through formal channels.
The new foreign minister in Denmark, Per Stig Møller, responded to criticism by Danish MPs
for not doing so by saying that, although Russian behavior was upsetting, the government would
not raise the issue because the situation with Russia changed after 9/11; this response was met
with renewed criticism.97 Somewhat comically, the criticism raised in the Danish parliament by
Albrechtsen and Søndergaard referred to the fact that Stig Møller had himself been a part of a
group of MPs that wrote to his own predecessor as foreign minister, demanding that Denmark
bring charges against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights for what was going on in
Chechnya. The intersection of Danish military interests and values-driven Danish foreign policy
in the 2000s over the War on Terror revealed a prioritization of the former over the latter.
The NATO mission in the War on Terror was to defend the borders of the alliance. This
was a mission to which the new Danish prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Left/Venstre,
V), heartily cosigned following his election in November 2001. Fogh Rasmussen is famously –
or infamously – a critic of Russia, to put it lightly, and eventually left his post as prime minister
to serve as General Secretary of NATO, from 2009 to 2014. He was friends with George W.
Bush and shared with him a similar outlook; he is a member of the deceptively-named Left party,
which is actually conservative liberal. While he was an active supporter of the War on Terror and
on military cooperation with Russia in this endeavor, as well as closer NATO cooperation with
Russia, he also actively pursued interests that Russia had pushed against for years. Fogh
Rasmussen was, and still is today, a passionate advocate for NATO expansion, particularly to
countries in Russia’s neighborhood. He also advocated for a continued US military presence in
Europe. At the November 2002 NATO summit in Prague, seven states were invited to begin
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accession talks: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. With the
exception of Slovenia, all these countries were part of the Warsaw Pact; three of them were
former Soviet republics. At the same summit, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, and Georgia were
reaffirmed as non-member contributors to NATO.
Fogh Rasmussen spoke at the summit and, in commenting on the historic NATO
membership of former Soviet republics, said, “Let me stress: Our enlargement is not directed
against Russia. It is an effort to heal and integrate Europe. We all have an interest in this process.
Russia will also benefit.”98 The following day, he spoke to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC). Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze also gave an address, in which he argued that
Georgia’s future as an independent nation hinged upon continued NATO’s eastward expansion;
the membership invitations to Romania and Bulgaria, therefore, were welcome developments, as
they expanded Black Sea representation in NATO’s area of operations.99 These were ideas with
which Fogh Rasmussen agreed. He continued to present NATO’s eastward expansion as a matter
of getting the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe “safely inside our Western
cooperation organizations”.100 This clearly implies safety from something; the context indicates
that it is Russia from which these new democracies must seek protection.
Fogh Rasmussen explained his commitment to multilateralism as “the simple reason
that, as individual nations, we are in no position to stand alone in matters of international
security”.101 He also continually invoked Denmark’s 1864 military defeat to Germany. History
remained an important tool for him. As late as 2008, the Danish military was reportedly still
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using anti-Russian/Soviet/communist names and scenarios for basic training scenarios, examples
of which include: “Red alliance has entered Danish territory”; “Russia, Poland and other allies
have united against Denmark because the Slavic minorities residing in Denmark have been
discriminated against”; and “Russia, Poland and other allies have invaded parts of South
Sjælland and Lolland-Falster”.102 It should be noted that Denmark has never been home to a
sizeable Slavic minority population – in the first quarter of 2020, less than 2% of the overall
population originated from a Slavic country.103
The lens through which Fogh Rasmussen viewed the role Denmark should be playing
internationally was scarred by Denmark’s past experiences with its neighbors; in the mid-2000s,
neighborhood policy became an important component of his security policy. From the mid-2000s
until the end of his tenure as prime minister, Fogh Rasmussen also began to heavily link energy
security to national and European security; this will be analyzed in a later chapter. He continued
to hold, however, that securitizing moves being made in Europe by NATO, whether expansion of
membership or expansion of missile defenses, were not threats to Russia.
Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia was not met with a military response by Western
Europe, but Fogh Rasmussen’s rhetoric towards Russia changed markedly after the fact. He also
pointed to the war as a case for why the EU needed to strengthen its foreign and security
policy.104 By the beginning of 2009, the primary military challenges for Denmark remained the
pirates in Somalia and the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Fogh Rasmussen, however, still made a
point of mentioning in his New Year’s Eve address to the nation that Danish soldiers and police
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officers were deployed to Georgia, to ensure peace there.105 This is indicative of where he
continued to perceive Russia as a threat, and which type of threat was most salient to Denmark.
Fogh Rasmussen stepped down from his position as prime minister a few months later and took
up the role of General Secretary of NATO. He took his focus on Russia with him – the first
speech he delivered in the position, in September 2009, was titled “NATO and Russia: A New
Beginning”.
His successor back home in Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen (V; no relation to either of
the previous Rasmussens to also serve as prime minister), took a very different approach to
Russia and to Danish security – this approach will be more closely detailed in later chapters.
However, a clear theme that ran throughout all his policies across the board during his time as
prime minister (2009-11 and 2015-19) was a strengthened focus on neighborhood policy. In
2010, the Danish military was actively engaging in bilateral security cooperation with Ukraine,
with a focus on three areas: strengthening security dialogue; strengthening Ukraine’s ability to
participate in international peacekeeping; and strengthening democratic control using Ukraine’s
armed forces.106 However, expenditure on military aid to Ukraine had been decreased by over
half from 2009 to 2010 (6.3m DKK to 2.5m DKK), and was expected to be decreased even
further (2.5m DKK to 1.75m DKK) from 2010 to 2011.107 Rasmussen did not at this time
perceive Russia to be a military threat, so he focused Danish military efforts elsewhere. This was
in line with the recommendations of the 2008 Defense Commission, this time titled Danish
defense, Global engagement.108 Løkke Rasmussen did not have much time to implement his own
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policies, however. He lost the October 2011 election and was replaced as prime minister by
Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S).
Thorning-Schmidt was a social democrat on the opposite side of the political spectrum
and, incidentally, Denmark’s first female prime minister. Thorning-Schmidt announced in her
opening address to Parliament that, though Denmark must continue to make a marked
contribution to international missions, it “should not just be in the hard military missions. We
must also take responsibility for the soft security. Here, Denmark has very much to offer.”109
Russia featured relatively little in speeches she made during her tenure as prime minister, and she
appeared not to consider it much of a military or security threat, even in light of the ongoing
illegal Russian occupation of two Georgian territories. When asked why the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) allowed the sale of a certain weapon to Russia but not to Georgia, minister Villy
Søvndal (SF) explained that, according to Denmark’s “reluctant” weapons export policy, the
MFA had not assessed the sale of the weapon in question to be at risk for prolonging or
escalating the conflict in Russia.110
In 2012, Thorning-Schmidt announced, “We are reducing our defense spending on both
sides of the Atlantic as part of our fiscal consolidation. This raises hard questions about burden
sharing and our capacity to confront future security challenges.”111 This did not, however, reflect
a rejection of transatlantic cooperation – in the same address, she highlighted Afghanistan and
Libya as “examples of how NATO has adapted from Cold War confrontation in Europe to new
types of conflicts outside Europe”.112 Denmark was still committed to its military alliances; it
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was simply following the NATO line focusing on out-of-operations security. And at the time,
Russia was not posing an active military threat to countries west of the Black Sea.
In November 2013, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets of Kyiv to
protest their government’s suspension of the signing of the planned Association and Free Trade
Agreements between Ukraine and the EU. They, along with thousands of others in cities across
the country, remained in the streets until February, when the protests culminated in the 2014
Ukrainian Revolution. Pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych was ousted, and the democratic
amendments made to the constitution a decade prior as part of the Orange Revolution were
reinstated. These developments were highly concerning to Putin, who had also been concerned
by the original color revolutions in the mid-2000s (the others were Georgia’s Rose Revolution
and Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution). A week later, Russian soldiers without identifying insignia
captured the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea; the Russian Federation announced Crimea’s formal
incorporation in March 2014. Fighting also began in Eastern Ukraine that spring between
Ukrainian government forces and pro-Russian separatist forces, later joined by Russian troops.
This armed conflict is still ongoing as of May 2020.
Ukraine triggered a massive reorientation of European security interests. After the spring
of 2014, NATO pivoted its focus back to collective defense in Europe. The EU, alongside the US
and Canada, implemented several rounds of sanctions against Russia for its actions. NATO
augmented the strength of its Baltic Air Policing mission, established in 2004, and Denmark
deployed fighter jets in support of this augmentation. On the 150th anniversary of the defeat of
1864, Helle Thorning-Schmidt invoked for the first time the memory of the defeat as the catalyst
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for Denmark’s active foreign policy today.113 This was additionally the first year that she tied
energy security to European conventional security in one of her speeches.114 The old concept of
indirect security from the 1990s also began to feature more strongly in her rhetoric after Ukraine.
“We live in an uneasy time. And we have essentially two options. Either we help resolve the
crises that are out in the world. Or, we bury our heads and hope that they don’t hit us. I’m not in
doubt. We need to act,” she said at the opening of the 2014-15 parliamentary session. “We need
to fight outside for our security at home.”115
Thorning-Schmidt was voted out of office in June 2015, and Lars Løkke Rasmussen
returned to the seat of prime minister for a second time, this time until June 2019. However, he
maintained a similar foreign policy to Thorning-Schmidt with regards to Ukraine and continued
to support a political solution to the conflict there. One key difference in policy was that Løkke
Rasmussen reinstated the defense funding that Thorning-Schmidt had cut some years earlier.116
Increases in defense spending came following the deployment of Russian Iskander missiles in
October 2016 to Kaliningrad, which could reach Copenhagen; it also followed an incident in
2015 in which the Russian ambassador in Denmark “threatened to aim nuclear missiles at Danish
warships if Denmark joined [a European missile defense system]”.117 It was clear from his and
his government’s rhetoric that he wanted Denmark to be able to take better care of itself, rather
than rely solely on powerful friends. This theme carried on even after he left office again in 2019
– when President Trump attacked Denmark on Twitter for not spending enough on NATO
contributions, Løkke Rasmussen tweeted back, “And – as i told You at the NATO Summit in
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Bruxelles last year – we have had (proportionally) exactly the same numbers of casualties in
Afghanistan as US. We always stands [sic] firm and ready – so we will not accept that our
defence willingness is only about percentages.”118
Following the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, Denmark also agreed to deploy several
hundred soldiers to Estonia as part of the new Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) deterrence
measure, intended to act as a tripwire of any new Russian aggression against the Baltic countries.
Danish military buildup in the Baltic Sea region continues to be a staple fixture of Danish
defense policy, especially as Russian military planes continually violated Danish airspace and, in
several cases, simulated attacks on Danish targets in the years following 2014.
Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s economic policy towards Russia during his first stint as prime
minister arguably prioritized commercial and diplomatic interests over geopolitical concerns.
This spilled over into some of his security policy towards Russia in the mid-2010s. In 2017, MP
Mette Frederiksen (S) called on him to do more to link the concepts of energy and national
security in the face of the impending Nord Stream 2 pipeline.119 After she replaced him as prime
minister two years later, the pipeline was forced through and she was left to deal with what she
had perceived to be a threat to national security, years in the past.
Løkke Rasmussen’s minister of defense, Claus Hjort Frederiksen, also acknowledged at
the same time that Denmark’s preoccupation for the past number of years with fighting terrorists
meant that attention now needed to be turned back to the new threat landscape in Denmark’s
neighborhood. This acknowledgement came in response to Mette Frederiksen’s colleague from
the Social Democrats, Peter Hummelgaard Thomsen, arguing for the government to stop
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separating commercial and security assessments when it came to Russia, specifically with regard
to the growing threat of cyber attacks from Russia.120 A few months later, Hjort Frederiksen
admitted that Russia had been hacking the Danish military for over two years, and that it was
very likely that it was the Russian military intelligence-affiliated group Fancy Bear.121
The primary challenge of Danish military relations with Russia, looking ahead from
2020, will most likely take place in the Arctic. Norway, Russia, and the US are the actors who so
far have taken the most steps as far as military armament in the High North go; however,
increasing tensions, especially around areas such as the Norwegian island Svalbard, mean that
NATO and the Arctic coast states are having to rewire their military strategies in the region.
Denmark has reaffirmed its commitment to minimizing conflict in the Arctic, and perceives the
Russian buildup there as largely defensive, but maintains that Russian developments also
increasingly build out the capacity for offensive operations.122 Peaceful cooperation in the Arctic
will ask Danish leadership to reconcile commercial energy and shipping interests, environmental
preservation interests, issues of political representation with the Greenlandic people and selfgovernment, and security interests that balance the needs and signals of a very multipolar
security community. Greenland’s strategic military value to the growing importance of the Arctic
provided the first major international issue Mette Frederiksen had to deal with after her election
in the summer 2020; the quickly growing military significance of the Arctic is likely to ensure
that it will not be the last.
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Political Relations
The broad strokes of Denmark and Russia’s military relationship capture their political
relationship as well. Stated commitments by Danish leadership to either bilateralism or
multilateralism more often than not refer back to the EU either way; in the case of certain Danish
leaders and indeed most European politicians, NATO was also considered to be a political
organization. Denmark took issue with human rights violations and unsuccessful democratic
reforms in Russia. In Danish discourse, Europe was often framed as an institution rather than a
geography. These were the defining political issues that guided their relationship, including a
poor bilateral relationship for much of the 2000s.
By 1989, the dissolution process of the Soviet Union was already well on its way. In the
three Baltic Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, anti-Soviet and anti-communist
protests began several years earlier, as they did across much of the Soviet Union. Mikhail
Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost reform movements of the 1980s had the unintended
consequence of releasing nationalistic sentiments in the republics that had for decades been
repressed by Soviet military power. In the Baltics, protests at this time were directed against the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of fifty years earlier, which was responsible for secretly signing over
the Baltic states to the Soviet sphere of influence and paving the way for their illegal annexation
by the Soviet Union in 1940. Denmark, however, was at this time still prioritizing a bilateral
relationship with the Soviet Union. This prevented it from fully supporting the independence of
its Baltic neighbors, despite the local governments at this point being more in tune with the local
majorities than the central Soviet government.123
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However, this non-recognition policy was officially dropped at the beginning of 1990.
Politically, there was still disagreement in Denmark over how to best support Baltic
independence. The political right took a hawkish approach that emphasized putting pressure on
the Soviet government, “focused on the historical wrongs inflicted upon the Baltic countries by
the Soviet Union and expected good Soviet behavior as proof that it was no longer the brutal
great power it had been in 1940”.124 This expectation carried on through Danish and greater
Western perceptions of Russia throughout the 1990s. The dovish left supported détente and
feared taking any actions that could hurt democratic reform movements within the USSR;125
these concerns were resolved at the end of 1991 with the Soviet Union’s implosion, and the new
Baltic countries could now enjoy Denmark’s full political backing. Denmark was one of the first
countries to establish diplomatic relations with all three new Baltic states. Of note and indicative
of the intentions (based in the indirect security concept) behind Denmark’s strong support of
Baltic independence was that Poul Schlüter’s government did not express the same level of
support for the very similar Nagorno-Karabakh independence movement taking place at the same
time in Azerbaijan, also a former Soviet republic.126
In December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus undersigned the creation
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which would replace the USSR and which
prompted Gorbachev to resign as President of the Soviet Union. The Danish prime minister Poul
Schlüter (Conservative/Konservative, K) was overall very optimistic about the democratic,
reform-minded direction that the former Soviet republics, including the new Russian state, were
taking. Most of the Western world was as well, as it signaled a hopeful end to the Cold War, but
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Denmark had specific interests tied to increased openness in the Baltic Sea region. Schlüter
prioritized both solid international frameworks and assumption of responsibility by individual
states.127 The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was formed in 1992, with Russia as one of
the ten original members. The intention was to strengthen regional cooperation on three longterm priority areas: Regional Identity, Sustainable and Prosperous Region, and Safe and Secure
Region.128
These were positive developments in regional cooperation, but it did not take long for
friction points to arise in Denmark’s relationship to the new Russian state. The third of the
CBSS’ priorities, Safe and Secure Region, was necessitated to a significant degree by the fallout
of the Soviet Union’s breakup; one of its main focuses is upon human trafficking and fighting
cross-border crime. In the early 1990s, Denmark experienced increases in Russian smugglers,
who were granted asylum after being caught smuggling, and Russian human traffickers using the
Danish-German border and the Kastrup Airport in Copenhagen.129 The head of the Danish
Refugee Council (DRC) said in December 1993 that refugees coming from the Baltic countries
or from Russia had no reason to claim refugee status, and should therefore be turned away at the
border.130 The Danish and Swedish police were reportedly concerned that many of these refugees
were traveling with the help of Russian organized crime groups linked to the international
mafia.131
Russian espionage in Denmark was another continuous point of tension in the countries’
political relationship throughout the 1990s. Already in 1992, Danish intelligence (PET) was
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reporting that Russian spies were active in Denmark, and that this should be considered an
expression of strain in the relationship, as well as considered in light of Russia’s recent
application to the European Council.132 Keld Albrechtsen (Unity List/Enhedslisten, EL), an MP
who raised a high number of questions about Russia in the parliament throughout the 1990s,
asked the government to convince Russia that it was “unnecessary and unwise” for GRU, the
Russian military intelligence service, to increase its activity in Western Europe in response to the
planned expansion of NATO; evidently, a Moscow newspaper had announced that GRU
received orders to do so.133 This was in November 1995; in the spring of 1996, the Russian
embassy in Copenhagen installed security cameras that monitored the surrounding streets. The
surveillance made Danes living in the area uncomfortable, and the Copenhagen police received
several complaints about the cameras. The police responded that they did not have any
information to provide about the function of the cameras, because they were a part of the
embassy’s own security systems.134 And, as MP Anne Baastrup (Socialist People’s
Party/Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF) pointed out, there had not been the need for “such indiscreet
and comprehensive surveillance” prior to the spring of 1996.135
Before leaving office at the end of January 1993, Schlüter commented cryptically on
“worrying tendencies [in the former Soviet Union, including Russia] that contain meaningful risk
for democratic development”.136 He possibly meant Boris Yeltsin’s reforms by decree the year
before, a practice which allowed the Russian president to bypass the government’s legislative
bodies. Either way, Schlüter and his right-leaning conservative government were replaced a few
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weeks later by new prime minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (Social Democrats/Socialdemokratiet,
S) and his left-leaning government. After the failed coup against Yeltsin in October 1993, Nyrup
Rasmussen expressed his government’s support for Yeltsin as “the best guarantee for the
[political and economic] reform course” in Russia.137 A little more than a year later, Yeltsin sent
Russian troops into Chechnya. Nyrup Rasmussen also announced that Denmark would be on the
frontline of bringing Central European, Eastern European, and the Baltic countries into the
EU.138 These were two developments that would soon converge and bring Denmark and Russia
into a realm of political tension, and at times political conflict, for the next decade.
Russian military actions in Chechnya were infamously brutal, and a high number of
human rights abuses were committed by Russian soldiers on Chechen civilians.139 This quickly
caught international attention, especially in Denmark. Member of parliament (MP) Bertel
Haarder (Left/Venstre, V) asked Nyrup Rasmussen to limit or avoid entirely Danish
representation in Russian victory ceremonies commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of
World War II, to protest the barbaric acts happening in Chechnya. “The democracies of the West
have already been scandalously passive in this tragic case,” he argued. “The passiveness has
strengthened the aggressive and undemocratic forces in Russia, while the liberal democrats have
been left behind like in the ‘30s, when the West’s democracies displayed passiveness and thus
made it easier for the dictators to crush democratic forces.”140
The longer the conflict stretched on, the more political concerns it gave rise to in
Denmark, which is rather removed geographically from the North Caucasus. Keld Albrechtsen
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was worried that the Baltic countries’ poor treatment of their ethnic Russian minorities would
give Russia an excuse to attack them.141 Holger K. Nielsen, a social democrat who would
become minister of foreign affairs some twenty years later, called the Western response
“embarrassing” and said it was “terrible that President Yeltsin, whom the West supported, fully
backs up the murders”.142
Neither the First Chechen War nor the Russian leadership’s behavior during it were
promising in fulfilling the political right in Denmark’s expectation that the new Russia would
distance itself from the brutality of the Soviet Union. The fears expressed by Albrechtsen and
Haarder, who fall on opposing ends of the political spectrum, share a common image of Yeltsin’s
Russia in the 1990s potentially playing the role of Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s, and Chechnya
potentially serving as the catalyst for war returning to Europe and spilling into other countries
closer to Denmark. These comparisons were made by Nyrup Rasmussen as well, in such a way
that further reflected his apparent rhetoric-only approach. In reminding Danes of their country’s
history choice to rescue nearly all Danish Jews from the Nazi during World War II, he said, “We
did it – because we had to do it.”143 Later that year, he went as far as to call Chechnya a
genocide; however, despite his earlier recall of Danish heroism in the face of genocide, this did
not inspire any greater action from his government.144
There is no evidence that these fears somehow informed Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s stated
aim of spearheading EU (or, for that matter, NATO) expansion to the east, which he had
announced prior to the outbreak of war in Chechnya anyway. But by the end of the First Chechen
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War, the Danish government’s objective of spreading EU and NATO membership to the Baltic
countries specifically was well-established. This objective was also now, to a degree, inseparable
from anxiety over a Russian invasion of the Baltic countries, although this anxiety stemmed
mostly from conjecture at this point. Nyrup Rasmussen believed that eastward expansion of the
EU linked peace and economy.145 Increasing the political ties of Denmark’s networks to the
Baltic countries ostensibly would make Denmark more secure overall as an individual nation, in
line with the Danish concept of indirect security.
When the world entered the new millennium in 2000, Vladimir Putin had already come to
power in Russia, and Russian troops had been sent into Chechnya for a second time; the Second
Chechen War had begun. The battle phase of the war was relatively brief and lasted from August
1999 to April 2000, when a military resolution was reached and federal government in Chechnya
was restored. However, a longer insurgency phase between Chechen militants and Russian forces
continued for much of the following decade. The mostly good relations between Russia and
Denmark up until this point were likely due in part to their limited direct contact – most of their
interactions took place in the common forum of Baltic state issues and development. It was
during the Second Chechen War that Denmark’s interests in expanding the EU would converge
with the conflict in Chechnya, and thereby bring Danish interests into contact with Russian ones.
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen visited St. Petersburg, Russia, in September 2001 – his second to
last month as prime minister – to speak at the summit of the Baltic Development Forum. Much
of his speech focused upon the upcoming Danish presidency of the EU, and its primary objective
of finalizing EU expansion to Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
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Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. “I want to underline that the enlargement will create
opportunities for Russia and St. Petersburg,” he said. “Let us open that window to Europe.”146
His words echoed a theme that would run throughout his successor Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s
tenure as prime minister of Denmark: Europe is institutional, not geographical. Fogh Rasmussen
(V) became prime minister in November 2001. Almost immediately, he reaffirmed his intentions
to promote NATO and EU enlargement, while also expressing an intent to help Russia “to find
its rightful place in European security politics”.147 His first year in office, however, brought him
into conflict with Russia relatively quickly.
Denmark assumed the EU presidency on July 1, 2002, and had the ambitious goal of
concluding negotiations with the ten candidate countries in Copenhagen in December.
Kaliningrad was the first issue. Originally called Königsberg, the port city on the Baltic was
annexed away from Nazi Germany by the Soviet Union in 1945 and renamed Kaliningrad. The
small region borders the Baltic Sea, Poland, and Lithuania – this meant that when the Soviet
Union dissolved, Kaliningrad Oblast (an oblast is a federal administrative unit of the Russian
Federation) became an exclave: a piece of Russia alone outside of the Federation. The impending
accession of Poland and Lithuania to the EU would cause issues for Kaliningrad, the largest of
which was the question of how Russian citizens would now travel between Russia proper and
Kaliningrad.
At the end of June, Jyllands-Posten, one of the largest newspapers in Denmark with a
penchant for international controversy, published an article by a member of its leadership, which
referred to Kaliningrad as “our time’s desperate, poor robbers’ nest” and suggested that the
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region return to the EU as Königsberg.148 The Russian government, angered over the suggestion
that Kaliningrad could undergo a change of borders, demanded an official reaction from the
Danish government.149 Danish politicians were upset by this demand, which they viewed as a
lack of respect by Russia for Danish freedom of expression and press. Jyllands-Posten’s chief
editor Jørgen Ejbøl, meanwhile, requested that the Russians write a letter to the editor if they
wanted a fight.150 Fogh Rasmussen made plans to resolve the issue of transit to Kaliningrad at
the planned EU-Russia summit in November of that year, which was supposed to be held in
Copenhagen. An unexpected diplomatic crisis in October, however, forced the summit to be
moved to Brussels.
When Chechnya declared independence from Russia in 1997, it did so under the
leadership of a man named Aslan Maskhadov. Maskhadov was a veteran of the first war in
Chechnya and continued to push for a political solution to the second, up until his death during a
raid by the FSB in spring 2005. His close political ally, Akhmed Zakayev, was also a veteran of
the conflicts, but left Chechnya soon into the Second Chechen War to seek medical attention.
Rather than return to Chechnya, he stayed abroad, where he could act as an international
spokesman for Maskhadov. At the end of October 2002, representatives of the Chechen
separatist government organized a Chechen World Congress in Copenhagen, where they could
meet and discuss the negotiation of a political solution to the war with Russia. The Congress
opened on October 28; its opening, however, as well as its premise, were overshadowed by
events in Moscow just a few days earlier.
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On October 23, fifty or so Chechen terrorists stormed the Dubrovka Theater during a
performance of the musical Nord-Ost and took hostage the sold-out audience of 850 people. The
terrorists demanded an immediate end to the war in Chechnya – if Russian troops were not
withdrawn within a week, they said, they would begin killing the hostages.151 Several hostages
were killed over the next two days as the results of miscommunication or attempted escapes. On
the morning of October 26, Russian special forces – the Spetsnaz – pumped a mysterious
chemical gas into the theater, intended to sedate everyone inside before they launched an assault
on the hostage takers. All of the terrorists were killed in the raid; however, the gas used by the
Spetsnaz also killed over one hundred of the hostages.152
Officially, the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility for the attack –
Basayev was also the warlord whose actions in Dagestan and Chechnya in the summer of 1994
served as the trigger for the Dagestan and First Chechen Wars. Although Basayev publicly stated
that Chechen president Maskhadov had no knowledge of the attack, the Russian government
accused Maskhadov of involvement anyway.153 Independently, multiple sources have alleged
that the FSB staged the attack, including the renowned investigative journalist Anna
Politkovskaya (assassinated on Putin’s birthday in October 2006) and former FSB agent
Alexander Litvinenko (fatally poisoned a month after Politkovskaya).154
Russia submitted a request through Interpol that Denmark arrest Zakayev, now in
Copenhagen for the Chechen World Congress. Danish authorities did so, but refused to comply
with the part of the request calling for Zakayev’s extradition. This refusal, combined with the

151

BBC 2002a.
BBC 2000b.
153
BBC 2000c.
154
Satter 2016.
152

65

Danish government’s refusal to halt the Congress taking place in the wake of the theater crisis,
caused the Danish-Russian relationship to plummet. The Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller
(Conservative People’s Party/Konservative Folkeparti, KF) expressed his regret for this
downturn in an otherwise essential relationship, but simultaneously found it highly important
that, now more than ever, moderate forces such as those gathered at the Congress continue to
work together in pursuit of a political solution to the war in Chechnya.155
Common themes among responses by Danish politicians to Zakayev’s arrest were
displeasure that the Danish government had complied with Russia’s request and appreciation that
it had not prevented the Congress from taking place, as this would have violated freedom of
speech in Denmark. There was uncertainty, however, over what to do with Zakayev. If Denmark
refused to extradite him, its options were to free him and risk further anger from Russia (which
the right-wing MP Peter Skaarup described as a “friendly” nation) or to prosecute him and use
Danish resources on the case; if Denmark chose to extradite him, it risked international criticism
for human rights violations.156
There are also indications that certain sectors of Danish politics were concerned, not just
about criticism for violating Zakayev’s rights, but also for the actual wellbeing of Zakayev if he
were sent back to Russia. Mogens Lykketoft (S) asked that the government wait to extradite him
until it had first gone through the European Court of Human Rights – earlier that fall, Georgian
president Eduard Shevardnadze had done the same thing in the face of Russian pressure to
extradite the dozen or so Chechen terrorists recently detained in Georgia.157 The question of what
had happened to these fighters upon their arrival in Russia remained one of interest to the
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political left in Denmark, more often the Russia-skeptical side of the spectrum there, even after
the resolution of the Zakayev case.158 The Danish government released Zakayev at the beginning
of December, citing insufficient documentation in Russia’s initial extradition request to justify
actually extraditing him.
While this case played out during November 2002, Anders Fogh Rasmussen decided to
move that month’s EU-Russia summit from Copenhagen to Brussels, so as to offset Putin’s
threats of pulling out of the summit in response to the conflict with Denmark. The main issue on
the table for this summit was that of transit between Russia and Kaliningrad once the countries
surrounding Kaliningrad became EU members and thus adopted EU laws concerning crossborder movement. Fogh Rasmussen was prepared to push right back on Russian pressure, and
said on the plane to the summit that it did not matter whether an agreement came out of the
summit or not; his foreign minister Per Stig Møller was, in contrast, concerned that Denmark
would be painted as anti-Russian if the negotiations failed.159
The negotiations, however, succeeded. The EU and Russia agreed to grant special travel
documents to Russian citizens going to and from Kaliningrad. In the post-agreement press
conference, a member of the Danish delegation was allowed to choose which questions could be
asked to the heads of state; when a French reporter asked Putin about Chechnya, Putin lashed out
and threatened the reporter with what he called a “final circumcision”.160 This odd exchange did
give Putin and Fogh Rasmussen something else about which they could agree – after the press
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conference, Fogh Rasmussen remarked, “You were quite right, that your own journalists are as
critical as ours.” “They are bandits, all of them,” Putin replied, and the two men laughed.161
Success at the Kaliningrad summit did not change the fact that the Chechen World
Congress had set Danish-Russian relations on a powerful downward spiral. Compounding the
immediate fallout of the clash, Fogh Rasmussen made eastward expansion of the EU and NATO
the framework for Denmark’s Europe policy in the years to come.162 This would implicitly bring
him, his country, and both organizations into conflict with Russia. Explicitly, Fogh Rasmussen
saw Denmark’s opportunity to play an influential role in eastward expansion as its opportunity to
cast off a century of “small state policy and appeasement policy with regards to first Germany
and later the Soviet Union”.163
In the winter of 2004, a number of Danish journalists were denied visas to Russia as
retaliation for their critical coverage of the war in Chechnya, including the renowned Russia
scholar Vibeke Sperling. At around the same time, the Russian government closed down the
Danish Refugee Council’s office in Russia, significantly limiting how much humanitarian aid
work Denmark could do in Chechnya, although it continued to financially support other aid
organizations working in the Caucasus. MP Margrete Auken (SF) was not satisfied, saying, “It
could easily be that Russia is saying, ‘Little Denmark over here, which happens to have a prime
minister who called the Chechens a bunch of criminals – we could really screw them’.”164 She
continued on to criticize her government for not doing much more other than speaking out
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sharply against Russia, echoing sentiments expressed by other MPs on the same topic a decade
earlier.
Beginning in 2003, Fogh Rasmussen’s rhetoric grew markedly more anti-Russia and antiSoviet Union. Previously, when he mentioned Russia in speeches, it was almost always in a
context of cooperation. But after the Chechen World Congress and the beginning of the
downturn in Danish-Russian relations, he began to continually reference the Soviet Union and
the shadow of communism over Eastern Europe during the twentieth century, and Denmark’s
suppression from 1864-1945. Fogh Rasmussen’s rhetoric is a prime example of the conflict
narrative in Rosanna Farbøl’s theoretical framework for the politicization of Denmark’s Cold
War history; the conflict narrative demonizes the communist tyranny in the East, and lionizes the
free democracies in the West, the defenders of freedom in the US, and the NATO loyalists in
Denmark.165 Farbøl argues that it draws primarily from the so-called small state mentality
Denmark developed across its century of defeat, and derives meaning from the Western
“victory” over the Soviet Union.
Nor did Fogh Rasmussen limit himself to deploying solely Danish historical experiences;
in 2006, he hosted a 50th anniversary memorial concert in Copenhagen commemorating the
Hungarian Revolution and took the speaking opportunity to further invoke the specter of
Soviet/Russian villainy. In contrast, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s left-leaning government of most of
the 1990s held that the past cannot be used as a compass.166 Danish researchers Mellander and
Mouritzen conducted an analysis of Danish assertiveness under Fogh Rasmussen and concluded,
“Until 2008 (including the April Bucharest summit [at which Georgia and Ukraine were

165
166

Farbøl 2018.
Farbøl 2018, p. 77.

69

effectively promised NATO membership]), there is not one single instance of Danish restraint.
There is not the slightest effort to avoid insulting Russia…The intransigent and value-based
Danish stance in connection with the Chechen Congress obviously represents an assertion
leap”.167
Leading up to that April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Fogh Rasmussen argued
fervently at home and abroad for the continued relevance of NATO, which he viewed as a
political organization just as much as a military one.168 He supported the linkage of the EU and
NATO missions. He also continued to push the idea that Europe is institutional, not
geographical. When Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, he said of the occasion, “As
members of the European Union, Romania and Bulgaria are now regaining their rightful place in
the European family of nations.”169 Fogh Rasmussen supported EU membership for Turkey, due
to its long-running institutional ties to the EU and the various iterations that came before it, but
he did not support EU membership for Russia. He used the same reason to justify NATO and EU
membership for Ukraine and Georgia, which is by no means a unanimous opinion across either
organization. Implicitly or explicitly taking this view of what is Europe allowed him to continue
to keep Russia on the outside and as an “other”.
This also adds a political dimension specifically to extending NATO membership to
Ukraine and Georgia, which Fogh Rasmussen supported at the Bucharest NATO summit in April
2008.170 Due to British, French, and German opposition, Georgia and Ukraine were not granted
Membership Action Plans at the summit, but they received a commitment from NATO that they
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would become memberships eventually – it was a matter of when. Russia was angered. “Russia
will take steps aimed at ensuring its interest along its borders,” a Russian general told the press
after the summit. “These will not only be military steps, but also steps of a different nature.”171
Four months later, Russia invaded Georgia, recognized the independence of the Georgian regions
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and established an illegal occupation in both regions which is still
ongoing.
The Russo-Georgian War was an obvious turning point for Europe and for NATO – war
had returned to Europe. Fogh Rasmussen was deeply concerned by the events in Georgia and
supportive of the country’s sovereignty; his already-strong rhetoric against Russia underwent a
clear increase following the war. As early as 2005, he had begun linking energy security to
political issues and instability in energy supplier countries, ostensibly a response to the shuttingoff by Russia of gas to Ukraine in the winter of 2005. However, in most references between 2005
and 2008, he refrained from calling out specific suppliers. After the war in August 2008,
however, Fogh Rasmussen drew ever-clearer delineations between Russia as an undemocratic
actor, Russia as a major gas and oil supplier, and the political risk involved in the West with
continuing to grow energy dependency upon Russian resources.
In October 2008, he expressed the need for a green revolution in the West, to put distance
between Western energy consumption and greater need for various suppliers. “We must advance
our freedom with a green revolution that reduces the power of totalitarian regimes,” he told the
Danish parliament.172 Denmark did in earnest undertake the task of a green revolution – this will
be covered further in the later chapter on energy. However, Anders Fogh Rasmussen left the post
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of prime minister in April 2009 to become the Secretary General of NATO. While he had
grounded the green revolution in political issues, his successor Lars Løkke Rasmussen (V)
entered office with a different outlook on Danish-Russian relations, as well on the direction of
the Danish economy; he instead grounded the green revolution in economic issues. This priority
change in 2009 meant that Russia as a political threat was downgraded for the next five years,
until Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014 forced Europe and NATO to reorganize their
security and political priorities.
Løkke Rasmussen’s primary objective regarding Russia when he came into office was to
salvage the rotten relationship he had inherited from the outwardly assertive Fogh Rasmussen.
He was an arguably much more inwardly focused prime minister than Fogh Rasmussen, at least
during his first stint as prime minister (2009-11). He and his foreign minister Lene Espersen
came under fire from the Social Democrats for what they alleged to be a de-prioritization of an
informal summit between the foreign ministers of the Arctic states. Though attendance at the
summit included US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Russian foreign minister
Sergei Lavrov, Espersen did not attend because she was on vacation with her family at the time;
the justice minister attended in her stead.173
Løkke Rasmussen’s friendlier approach to Russia had a rapid payoff – in April 2010,
Russian president Dmitry Medvedev visited Denmark. It was the first time a Russian head of
state had visited Denmark in fifty years. The focus of the visit was a modernization partnership
between the two countries, signed during the visit. Putin, serving as prime minister at the time,
made his own state visit to Denmark a year later, in April 2011. He and Løkke Rasmussen were
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friendly as they stressed the economic closeness of their countries and their political ties over
security in Afghanistan and development in the Baltic and Arctic regions, before ending the
night with beers in Copenhagen’s Tivoli Gardens.174 Putin also visited Danish shipping giant
A.P. Møller-Mærsk (known internationally as simply Maersk) during his brief visit. These
bilateral visits, paired with the Nord Stream pipeline project (detailed in the next chapter),
represented both a marked improvement in the bilateral relationship as well as Løkke
Rasmussen’s focus on economic issues rather than political, security, or geopolitical.
In October 2011, Løkke Rasmussen was replaced as prime minister by Helle ThorningSchmidt (S). Thorning-Schmidt arguably downgraded Russia as a political priority even more,
although she was forced to deal with a Soviet-era scandal during her political campaign and
cabinet formation process following her election. Ole Sohn (SF), who she named her minister of
economic and business affairs, was a former member of the Danish Communist Party (DKP) and
was the party’s chairman during the late 1980s. Allegations, which were then confirmed in 2012
in a series of investigative articles published in Jyllands-Posten, emerged that he had personally
received millions of Danish crowns (DKK) in cash from the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) between 1987 and 1990. It was no secret that the CPSU funded communist
parties, including the DKP, around the world. Sohn, however, claimed that he had never
accepted cash from Moscow and never knew that others in DKP were doing so.175
Valentin Falin, who had served as the last Soviet chief of all economic support to foreign
communist parties, countered, “This doesn’t necessarily mean that Sohn personally got the
money…but he was the addressee, so it isn’t a question of whether it happened with or without

174
175

Løkke Rasmussen and Putin 2011.
Pihl and Rose 2011.

73

his knowledge. Of course the chairman knew it.”176 Sohn continued to deny any knowledge of
the DKP receiving money at all from Moscow, and this was where the scandal took root during
the 2011 parliamentary elections. Thorning-Schmidt had to defend her decision to name him
minister of economic and business affairs in light of his dishonesty, but she continued to express
her confidence in him and refused to consider opening investigations against him.177
The good relationship between Denmark and Russia, due to Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s
efforts from 2009-11, combined with Helle Thorning-Schmidt’s own political focuses to ensure
that there were few episodes of real significance to the bilateral political relationship before
Ukraine in 2014. Not even an espionage scandal in April 2012 was able to derail the relationship;
a Finnish professor teaching at the University of Copenhagen, Timo Kivimäki, was charged (his
initial arrest came in September 2010) with delivering security policy assessments and
information that could be of interest to the FSB during multiple meetings with contacts at the
Russian embassy. The embassy employees suspected of espionage left Denmark before news of
the case broke, per an agreement between Denmark and Russia. “We have no interest in this case
burdening the otherwise good bilateral relationship,” foreign minister Villy Søvndal
announced.178
The Russian annexation of Crimea and fomentation of civil war in eastern Ukraine
changed, as they did so many other things, political relations between Denmark and Russia.
Helle Thorning-Schmidt, for one, significantly altered her rhetoric towards Russia. While she
had overall made few references to Russia in her speeches up until that point, afterwards she
began using an adaptation of Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s conflict narrative that played up
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Denmark overcoming its legacy of defeat. Denmark supported the sanctions that the EU put in
place against Russia, despite the potential negative effect that the sanctions (and Russia’s
counter-sanctions) could have on the Danish agriculture and food sectors. It also used its EU
Neighborhood Policy programs (which would be augmented under Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s
second stretch as prime minister) to further strengthen democratic reform and civil society in
Ukraine.179 Denmark continued to support a political solution to the crisis in Ukraine, a line
which was upheld when Lars Løkke Rasmussen returned to the post of prime minister in June
2015.
Lars Løkke Rasmussen changed course from his earlier policy of friendly behavior
towards Russia and became to speak more harshly on Russian conduct. This was slightly
undercut by his foreign minister Kristian Jensen (V), who said in an interview with
Weekendavisen in September 2015 that “Crimea has returned to Russia”, followed by, “Nowhere
I’ve been in Europe is talking about how Crimea should be allowed to determine its own fate.”180
Jensen clarified in a later interview that that had been his observation – the focus of the rest of
Europe was on eastern Ukraine, not Crimea.181 While Jensen apparently did not really mean what
he had said, there were certain other voices in Danish politics who did agree with his words, and
believed them.
Marie Krarup is a member of the right-wing nationalist populist party Danish People’s
Party (Dansk Folkeparti/DF). In the 1980s, she trained as a Russian language officer with the
Danish Army. In the 1990s, she began working in the Defense Ministry and was stationed at the
Danish embassy in Moscow from 1998-2001 as a defense attaché. In 2011, she became a
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member of parliament, and she went on to become the defense spokesperson for DF. Krarup’s
opinions are so infamously pro-Russia that they played a role in breaking her longtime friendship
with Danish journalist Anna Libak, who is openly critical of Russia and with whom she served at
the embassy two decades earlier. In a 2018 documentary miniseries called Girlfriends in
Putinland (Veninder i Putinland), the two traveled to Russia together and attempted to reconcile
their friendship. “If the defense spokesperson in the country’s second largest party is working for
us to not dissociate ourselves from a great power that takes parts of a neighboring state with
military force, that makes them a security threat,” Libak says about Krarup in the
documentary.182 “I’m mad at her because I think she’s speaking against her better knowledge
about what Russia is. She can speak Russian, she knows well what’s happening. She lets her
ideology blind her.”183
Krarup was fired from her post as defense spokesperson for DF later in 2018 – the
reasoning behind this decision, according to her successor Jeppe Jakobsen, appeared to be her
opinions and statements about Russia.184 But throughout the 2010s, she has remained a constant
voice advocating for the Russian side of international issues in Denmark, despite never really
finding sympathy for these views elsewhere in Danish politics. In 2015, the EU established the
East Stratcom taskforce, designed to combat Russian misinformation in Eastern Europe
(including in Russia itself). Krarup appeared to feel personally attacked by her government’s
support of the taskforce – she accused foreign minister Anders Samuelsen (Liberal Alliance, LA)
of criminalizing “certain opinions, especially EU-critical and Islam-critical opinions”, opinions
which she openly espouses.185 Samuelsen, in return, expressed concern that she had “publicly
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questioned FE’s [the Danish Defense Intelligence Service] threat assessment of Russia”.186
Krarup also objected strongly to the criminalization of knowingly abetting foreign influence
campaigns in Denmark, which was passed in 2019.
Over the next few years, Krarup became more and more outspoken; this meant that she in
turn came under more and more criticism, including terms such as “useful idiot”, “fifth column”,
“Putin’s friend”, and “traitor”.187 In the fall of 2016, she was widely criticized for saying that the
EU poses a greater threat to Denmark than Russia. In response, she wrote an entire book
defending her viewpoint, titled New Cold War (Ny Kold Krig), intended to portray the other side
of the debate. In the introduction alone, she claims that uncontrolled immigration and
Islamization are the real danger to Europe’s freedom.188 She also pins the Russo-Georgian War
of 2008 fully on Georgia for attacking South Ossetia, which she calls “Russia’s ally” – implying
that South Ossetia is indeed an independent and recognized state, capable of forming alliances.189
Though Krarup’s party ultimately did not back her perspectives, her consistency and
outspokenness cannot be denied; she remains a key voice in those spheres of Danish politics that
concern Russia.
Though almost always alone in Denmark in her views, Marie Krarup does represent a
certain Danish political perspective about Russia; she stands across from voices such as Keld
Albrechtsen in the 1990s or Anders Fogh Rasmussen in the 2000s. Fogh Rasmussen, for his part,
stopped serving as Secretary General for NATO in 2014 and has continued to fight against
Russia as a private citizen. In 2016, while working as an external advisor to Ukrainian president
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Petro Poroshenko, he put together the Friends of Ukraine initiative, which his website describes
as “a group of leading politicians and former senior diplomats…[which] seeks to make the case
for why a reformed and European Ukraine matters”.190 In September 2019, he attended the 5th
Annual Tbilisi International Conference in Georgia, where he argued a case for how Georgia
could still join NATO in such a way that “would show Russia that creating frozen conflicts can’t
forever freeze Georgia’s future”.191
In 2018, the Danish Defense Intelligence Service reported that there was a threat of
Russian interference in coming Danish elections. The Russian embassy in Denmark tweeted out
a sarcastic response to the report, saying, “Since there is no difference in russophobic approach
between #DK Government and opposition, meddling into DK elections makes no sense”.192
Politically, Denmark remains largely unfriendly towards Russia, a reality of which Russia is
cognizant. Mette Frederiksen, prime minister for less than a year as of May 2020, appears to
uphold the same line on Russia that has reigned in Danish politics since the beginning of the
Ukraine crisis. She is likely to carry on this firm outlook towards Russia, due to the continuing
dynamics in the bilateral relationship such as unsatisfactory (from the Western perspective)
institutional reforms in Russia, continuing Russian aggression in its neighborhood, and now new
changes in the Danish-Russian energy-economic relationship.

Economic Relations
The two most important things to understand for the economic relationship between
Denmark and Russia are the Danish policy of tying security to development aid, and the
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European energy sector. When the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe were
crumbling, Poul Schlüter and the rest of the world were reading the writing on the wall. Going
into the 1990s, the Danish government was seeking to expand investment opportunities in
Eastern Europe. It hoped to link this economic initiative, which would be to the benefit of the
Danish business community, with support for reforms towards political pluralism and human
rights in the new democracies emerging in the east.193 The Øststøtte (“East support”) program
was intended to build on this, and in 1991 an aid commission was established which listed
Eastern Europe and the USSR as a priority. The concept of indirect security was not codified into
Danish defense policy until the end of the decade, and later governments would make more
explicit connections between Danish security and economic development policy. The early
efforts of Schlüter’s government to bolster political reforms in Eastern Europe, particularly in the
Baltic countries, can however be interpreted as an early iteration of this concept.
Denmark’s interactions with Russia throughout the 1990s largely took place through the
Baltic countries. Though Denmark was outwardly optimistic about the evolution of the new
Russian state (with a dip following the outbreak of war in Chechnya), its concerted efforts to
economically build up the Baltic countries specifically indicate a targeted policy of building a
buffer zone in the Baltic Sea region, should one again become necessary. Kaliningrad and the
northwestern region of Russia, with St. Petersburg at the epicenter, were also included in these
concerted efforts. As an example, the Danish government amended the existing export credit law
to help Danish companies invest and build infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region, especially in
the energy sector, where Denmark possesses strong technical expertise.194 This sort of support
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for economic development in the Baltic states and in Russia comprised the most meaningful
economic interactions between Denmark and Russia throughout the 1990s. Trade numbers were
overall insignificant between them. Denmark’s top export to Russia during this time was
agricultural products, and its top import from Russia was fuel-related products.
Danish policy in the Baltic Sea region during the 1990s focused on the nexus of
economics, politics, and security policies; beyond aid contributions earmarked for the economic
development of the Baltic Sea region, economics appeared to take a backseat among Danish
members of parliament, in favor of more pressing political and security concerns. In the late
‘90s, plans for eastward expansion of the EU and NATO gained traction in the international
community and were spearheaded in part by Denmark. Economic concerns began to assume a
greater role again, as Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s government painted EU expansion as the linkage
of peace and economy. Theoretically, deeper and more numerous trade ties are supposed to
decrease the propensity of conflict between countries that share the same network, if they do not
already trade directly with one another.195 The Baltic countries have long relied on Russia as
their largest trading partner, and as the centralization and internal markets of the Soviet Union
disappeared, this partnership continued to be of high importance. If Denmark increased its trade
ties with the Baltic countries, and in turn increased the dependence of those countries upon
Danish investments, so too would Russia be brought into this deepened trade network.
Nyrup Rasmussen explained it as wanting to be a country that others could count on. “To
do something for others is to be something. Especially when one does a little more than one
needs to do,” he said in his New Year’s Eve address in 1998.196 This provides an idealistic and
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value-driven rhetorical frame for economic aid as a tool of security policy, which would continue
to be a key pillar of economic relations between Denmark and Russia over the coming decades.
Russia’s heavy involvement and influence within its neighboring countries make it difficult to
speak of one and not mention the other, particularly in the wake of Russia’s ongoing military
engagements in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia interprets NATO and EU expansion towards its
borders as military and political-economic encirclement, respectively, by the West. Denmark’s
support and participation in both is compounded by its significant financial aid invested in
Russia’s immediate neighborhood – in the 1990s, that aid mostly went to Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania.
The state of the Danish-Russian economic and commercial relationship in the years
following the Soviet Union’s breakup laid foundational conditions for components of their
overall relationship in the decades to come. Direct bilateral trade between Denmark and Russia
was low, meaning that Denmark did not stand to lose catastrophically if its relations with Russia
were to be disrupted. There was also little room for asymmetry in their limited trading
relationship, eliminating a possible source of pressure or power dynamics that small countries
can often experience with larger trade partners. Relatedly, Denmark also did not depend on
imports of Russian gas or oil and had actually achieved energy self-sufficiency for the first time
in 1997.197 Russia’s economy depends upon its large wealth of natural resources, which Putin
quickly took steps to seize control of early on in his reign. Its position as a major supplier of oil
and gas to Europe (and, to increasing degrees in the 2010s, China) gives it a certain amount of
influence over various importers of these resources, although more so gas than oil.
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Denmark lacked this significant economic tie to Russia, so actions that put it in
opposition with Russia were of a lower cost than they would be for a country that depended more
greatly upon Russian resources. Support for Denmark among some of the Western-oriented
countries bordering Russia was also high, thanks to Danish investments there throughout the
1990s. Environmental protection efforts in the Baltic Sea region were an important area of
economic cooperation throughout the 1990s and were a priority of Danish Øststøtte money going
towards Russia, along with Poland and the Baltic countries, up through 2002. Entering the new
decade and millennium, therefore, the conditions were there for Denmark to afford to take up a
hard posture against Russia, which it did beginning in that year.
This was when the controversy surrounding the Russia-ordered arrest of Chechen
separatist leader Akhmed Zakayev in Copenhagen took place, unfortunately at the same time as
the deadly Dubrovka theater crisis in Moscow. The political falling-out between Russian
president Vladimir Putin and Danish prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen that occurred as a
response led to tense relations between the two countries for most of the 2000s. Figures released
by the Danish government in 2012 revealed that, from 2000 to 2011, Danish exports to Russia
increased 9.8% annually.198 In spite of this increase, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Austria,
Belgium, and Holland were all able to increase their exports to Russia in the same time period by
so much that Denmark’s share of exports across that aggregated group fell from 4.2% in 2000 to
2.6% in 2011.199 Increased Russian trade with all of the other countries in this reference group is
a possible indicator of a Russian unwillingness to engage the Danes as much in the wake of the
Zakayev scandal and the resulting distance in the relationship between the two countries.
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Shipping has long been a major industry for both countries. Denmark’s position at the
mouth of the Baltic Sea, where the Skagerrak and Kattegat straits connect the Baltic to the North
Sea, gives it strategic value both militarily and commercially. The Baltic Sea is of high
importance to the Russian shipping industry – if it were to lose shipping access in the Baltic, for
example due to a NATO blockade, it could redirect shipping through its Arctic and Pacific ports,
but this would be quite costly to do.200 These geographical realities for each country mean that,
even if overall relations are going through a low, there is still guaranteed interaction in this sector
at the very least. Russia increased its shipping traffic through the Baltic in the early 2000s,
because it opened a new oil terminal at the Primorsk port in 2001. By 2015, Primorsk was
shipping a third of Russia’s total oil exports, which comes out to approximately 70 million tons
of oil daily.201
However, in the early 2000s there were issues with Russian ships passing through Danish
waters, particularly around the Storebælt bridge connecting the Danish islands of Sjælland and
Fyn, without pilots.202 This was a serious concern for the Danish government – the sailing route
there is inherently difficult, and an increase in oil tankers, as well as an increase in ships not
utilizing pilots, meant there was an increased risk for ship collisions that would endanger human
lives and environmental conditions, particularly if there were a resulting oil spill. There was
frustration on the Danish side that, despite Russia’s expansion of its oil shipping capacity, there
was no response by Russian authorities to Danish pressure about increasing security by forcing
Russian ships to use pilots.203 Anders Fogh Rasmussen mentioned the persistent issue as well
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during his address at the 6th Baltic Development Forum Summit, which was held in September
2004 in Hamburg, Germany.204
Overall, however, it was clear that Fogh Rasmussen, a known hardliner on Russia, did
not really consider bilateral economic cooperation with Russia to be a priority, unlike his
eventual successors as prime minister. Especially during the mid-2000s, he referred to expanding
economic cooperation with the US, the EU, and China, but not to Russia. This common
omission, in contrast to rhetoric by later prime ministers and in tandem with the earlier-cited
figures showing Denmark being outpaced by its peers in the EU with regards to exports to
Russia, was apparently deliberate. At around the same time, in the winter of 2006, Russia shut
off gas supplies to Ukraine in the middle of a dispute over gas prices. This was not an isolated
incident – a 2007 report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency found 55 occasions upon
which Russia had shut off or threatened to shut off energy deliveries to other countries between
1992 and 2006, almost all of which were for political reasons.205
Gas and oil imports from Russia by Denmark have historically been negligible. Denmark
owns its own oil and gas fields in the North Sea, and primarily imports additional energy from
Norway. More importantly, Denmark’s massive progress in the renewable energy technology
sector since the scare of the 1970s oil crisis made it one of the European countries with the
highest energy security in electricity by 2018 and the first to source half of its electricity
consumption from wind by 2020.206 But a decade before these figures became a reality, the shift
to primarily sustainable energy systems was still underway. The Social Democrats first broached
the subject of Russia as an unstable energy supplier on 27 January 2006, a little less than a month
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after Russia shut off (and then restored) the gas to Ukraine, and posed it as a motivator for
increasing efforts towards sustainable energy in Denmark.207 Potential gas disruptions to the
Baltic countries were also a concern in Denmark.
The Baltic countries became EU members in 2004, fulfilling a political and economic
goal of the Danes, but in 2006 the EU forced Lithuania to shut down its Ignalina nuclear power
plant, one of its most important energy sources. The Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti,
DF) argued that doing so, and thereby forcing Lithuania to become completely dependent upon
Russian energy, would open the door to a “Russian offensive”.208 Foreign minister Per Stig
Møller responded that it would be the policy of the Danish government to aid in modernizing
Lithuania’s energy production, transmission, and distribution sectors.209 At the same time,
Danish economic aid was also going towards democracy and human rights groups in Belarus,
economic development programs in Russia’s Kaliningrad and Pskov oblasts, and civil society
capacity building in the North Caucasus, all through Denmark’s Neighborhood Program.210
Economic aid continued to be used as a tool of foreign policy in countries neighboring Russia,
intended to create external pushback on what Holger K. Nielsen (Socialist People’s
Party/Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF) called a country “moving quickly in the direction of a
dictatorship”.211
As EU expansion also began to run up against its limits as a “stability generating
instrument”, Fogh Rasmussen placed a greater premium on making Danish neighborhood
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policies more attractive to the countries in which they would be operating.212 This economic
objective ties in with his stated desire to target active, preventive Danish foreign and security
policy towards dealing with problems “exactly where they arise”.213 Starting in 2006, Fogh
Rasmussen’s speeches began to focus much more on the issue of energy supply security for
Denmark. He made frequent references to rejecting dependence upon politically unstable
countries and regions for the purchase of gas and oil, though he did not initially name specific
countries or regions. He did, in 2007, mention that the increasing concentration of fossil fuel
production in Russia, and increasing European dependency upon that production, was a source of
vulnerability for Europe.214
At this time, Russia and Germany were well underway with a gas pipeline project in the
Baltic Sea that they called Nord Stream. The idea for Nord Stream was first pitched in 1997, it
was recognized by the EU as a “project of common interest” in 2000, and by 2005 the design
process and negotiation of contracts had begun in earnest under the auspices of the Nord Stream
AG company, in which the Russian state-owned gas giant Gazprom is the majority
stakeholder.215 The project was presented as one that would increase European energy security
by providing up to 55 billion cubic meters of Russian gas yearly. The pipeline would run from
Vyborg in northwestern Russia to Greifswald in northern Germany, passing along the way
through the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Germany, as well
as the territorial waters of Russia, Germany, and Denmark.216
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The Baltic countries and Poland were almost immediately opposed to the project, as their
own experiences with Russia as their majority gas supplier had not been positive. Despite Fogh
Rasmussen’s repeated resistance to Russian engagement, and explicit statements beginning in
March 2007 that increased energy imports from Russia made Europe more vulnerable, he was
positive about Nord Stream. In February 2007, a month before he first mentioned Russia as
increasing European vulnerability, he told Polish prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński that the
pipeline would contribute to Europe’s energy security. “Denmark will not interfere in Germany’s
and Russia’s decision to lay a gas transmission line in the Baltic Sea between the two countries,”
he announced.217
Fogh Rasmussen’s rhetoric was supportive of the Baltic countries’ concerns, and he had a
history of standing up for them – as an example, in 2005 he was one of several Western leaders
who demanded Putin issue an apology to the Baltic countries for their earlier annexation and
occupation by the Soviet Union. However, his support of Gazprom’s Nord Stream project and
statements to Kaczyński flew in the face of his Baltic Sea region neighbors’ fears about the
pipeline, as well as his own stated opposition to purchasing more gas and oil from Russia. The
incongruity between Fogh Rasmussen’s words and actions is both compounded and perhaps
explained by a business deal concluded in the summer of 2006.
Denmark has its own state energy company, formerly known as DONG (Dansk Olie og
Naturgas/Danish Oil and Natural Gas) but renamed in 2017 to Ørsted. Before 2006, Denmark
had never purchased gas from Russia. In the summer of that year, Ørsted signed a deal with
Gazprom, under which Ørsted would purchase 1 billion cubic meters of gas annually for twenty
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years, beginning in 2011.218 Ørsted would also be delivering gas from a Norwegian gas field to
Gazprom’s UK subsidiary, per a separate deal signed at the same time.219 The Executive Vice
President of Ørsted who negotiated the deal, Kurt Bligaard Pedersen, became a managing
director with Gazprom in 2014 and went on to become CEO of its UK division, a position he still
holds as of May 2020.
It is likely that this enormous contract between the Danish state-owned energy enterprise
and its Russian counterpart was a factor in Fogh Rasmussen’s support of Nord Stream; this also
appears to be the first major instance of an apparently emerging pattern in which geopolitical and
security concerns in Denmark were subjugated to economic ones when it came to Russia. In May
2007, three months after his promising words to Kaczyński and just under a year after the
conclusion of the Ørsted-Gazprom deals expanding cooperation at home and in the North Sea,
Fogh Rasmussen told his parliament, “[The North Sea] has given supply security and a good
economy. But one day, the adventure in the North Sea will end. And on that day, we must have
other energy sources ready to ensure that Denmark can continue to supply itself with energy. We
do not want to be dependent upon buying oil and natural gas from countries and regions that will
abuse energy supplies as a tool of foreign and security policy.”220
In August 2008, Russia invaded the small former Soviet republic of Georgia. Russia had
spent much of the year engaging in increasingly provocative actions towards Georgia and in its
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, culminating in the mobilization and assembly
of Russian forces along the border between Russia and South Ossetia during the first week of
August. When Georgian forces responded to aggression from South Ossetian positions, Russian
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troops were ready to move in.221 The war lasted five days. During that time, Russian forces
bombed the country, including attempts at bombing the strategically essential Baku-TbilisiCeyhan oil pipeline; caused massive refugee displacement; and came within 25 miles of taking
the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. US diplomat Ronald Asmus argued that the Russian offensive had
the objective of signaling to Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, who was one of the
instrumental figures in Georgia’s democratic Rose Revolution in 2003 and who built close ties to
the US and to NATO, that Putin would not tolerate Georgia’s attempts to go west.222 It is
additionally important to note that this narrative of events is drawn from Western and Georgian
sources, and the Russian government’s version of events is very different from the one described
here.
At the Bucharest NATO summit in April 2008, NATO promised eventual membership to
Georgia and Ukraine; supporters of this promise included Anders Fogh Rasmussen. One of the
consequences of the war was an illegal military occupation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by
Russian troops, and Russian recognition of both regions as sovereign states. The existence of
these territorial disputes is a blocking factor in Georgia’s hopes of NATO accession, according
to a 1995 NATO study on expansion.223 The context of this war is important, because it provides
the context for further economic relations between Denmark and Russia that would downgrade
political and security interests in favor of economic gain. Though energy security, in all its
forms, has been a Danish priority for decades, and though Denmark has made great strides in the
technical aspects of achieving energy security, the government, Danish companies, and
sometimes both have a less stellar record on Russian energy deals affecting the energy security
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of other countries. Nord Stream and its companion pipeline Nord Stream 2, which will be
covered later, are highly publicized and much-discussed examples of this. A much more obscure
example can be found further from home, in Georgia some two thousand miles away.
When Putin made a state visit to Denmark in April 2011, his first ever, he visited only
three parties: Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen; Queen Margrethe II; and the headquarters
of A.P. Møller-Mærsk, or Maersk, the world’s largest shipping company. At Maersk, he
discussed the need for investment in Russia’s port infrastructure, as well as Gazprom’s search for
partners to explore the Arctic for gas and oil reserves; Rosneft, the Russian state’s massive oil
company, was considering Maersk for the same task.224 In 2009, Maersk CEO Nils Smedegaard
Andersen had begun to investigate emerging market opportunities in Russia. Maersk launched a
new transatlantic service between St. Petersburg and Ecuador in 2010. At the opening ceremony
(attended by Putin, Løkke Rasmussen, and Smedegaard Andersen), the Danish prime minister
declared, “I am glad and proud that a Danish company is opening a new door together with its
Russian partners. This is an example of our bilateral relations, of our trade with you.”225
The opening ceremony was held at the Petrolesport container terminal at St. Petersburg’s
Bolshoi Port. Petrolesport is owned by Global Ports Investments, which was founded by
Transportation Investments Holding Limited (TIHL) in 2008 and is based out of Cyprus, a
known destination for Russian money laundering; TIHL co-founder Konstantin Nikolaev is
connected to Putin’s close circle of associates.226 APM Terminals (APM), a subsidiary of
Maersk, bought 37.5% of Global Ports in September 2012 and became co-controller, alongside
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TIHL, of Russia’s largest port operation company.227 The same month of Putin’s 2011 visit,
APM purchased the seaport in Poti, a city on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, and announced its plans
to transform the port into a new deep-water port. Without certain knowledge about Black Sea
regional politics and Georgian domestic politics, this investment may seem unremarkable, or at
least no more remarkable than any of the other 78 ports APM operates. However, APM’s
purchase of Poti further illustrates Maersk’s self-interested ties to Moscow’s political leadership.
In October 2012, Mikheil Saakashvili lost the parliamentary election to Bidzina
Ivanishvili, a Georgian billionaire who has close ties to the Kremlin. That same month, Georgian
businessman David Iakobashvili acquired assets previously held by Davit Kezerashvili, a former
defense minister under Saakashvili.228 Through parent companies, Iakobashvili is the owner of at
least two terminal operators at the APM-owned Poti port. The month after, Iakobashvili acquired
80% ownership of Petrocas Energy, a Cyprus-based oil transit company operating in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia’s Caspian region.229 He has a history of conducting business with
Bidzina Ivanishvili in Russia, where both men made their fortunes. Further financial ties between
Ivanishvili, the Poti seaport, and APM are alleged by members of the political opposition in
Georgia and former Georgian ambassador to the US Batu Kutelia.230
Several months later, in February 2013, the Kremlin’s chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov,
declared the Danish shipping company to be a “strategic investor” for Russia.231 A year after
that, in February 2014, war broke out in Ukraine. Maersk’s intensified commercial efforts in
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Russia meant that it could stand to lose heavily if economic ties between Russia and the EU were
broken or damaged by the conflict. Maersk said it was “following the developments in the
relationship between Russia and the EU with concerns”, emphasizing that relationship rather
than the actual crisis in Ukraine.232 Rosneft was one of the companies sanctioned by both the US
and EU. In December 2014, in a move condemned by the Georgian government, Rosneft
purchased one of the four oil terminals at the APM-owned Poti seaport from David
Iakobashvili’s Petrocas Energy.233 Poti is the only port in Georgia that can unload oil products
from tankers. Russian control of even one oil terminal at Poti allows Rosneft control over oil
flows through Georgia to the EU from Russia’s competing oil producers on the Caspian Sea.
Before leaving office, Saakashvili had proposed the idea of building Georgia’s first deepwater port. Deep-water ports can accommodate larger ships and therefore more types of goods;
these larger ships could potentially include NATO warships. After Ivanishvili came to power, he
picked up the idea and suggested Anaklia, a town only fifteen miles north of Poti and essentially
on the Abkhazian border. The port project, led by the US-funded Anaklia Development
Consortium (ADC) and the Georgian bank TBC Holding, was approved by the Georgian
government in 2016. APM had already announced in 2011 its intentions to transform Poti into a
deep-water port; there were now two rival projects being planned a very short distance apart, and
with very different backers.
Russia opposes a Georgian deep-water port, as this would make Georgia more valuable to
NATO and provide commercial competition for the nearest deep-water port, which is the
Russian port of Novorossiysk. In 2018, APM’s partner in the Global Ports Investment group, the
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Putin-associated TIHL, sold its shares to another Russian business group, the Delo Group. The
Delo Group is one of the primary operators at the port of Novorossiysk. APM, which already
owned a third of Russia’s largest port operator through its stake in Global Ports, was now
working with a major stakeholder in one of Russia’s largest seaports, which would also stand to
lose commercially from the Anaklia or Poti projects. Moscow has a history of making “attempts
to influence strategically important projects in the South Caucasus region in order to split the
participants or slow down the initiatives’ implementation”.234 Rosneft’s ownership of the oil
terminal at Poti, plus Delo’s partnership with APM, means Russia would at least have some
meaningful control over this piece of infrastructure.
Mamuka Khazaradze, one of the heads of the Anaklia port project and a member of the
political opposition in Georgia, claimed in 2018 that APM had been counter-lobbying Anaklia
for a long time.235 At the end of May 2019, it was revealed that an unauthorized land use permit
was granted to APM’s Poti project earlier in the month.236 The permit was canceled, but ADC
argued that the whole affair was evidence of a conspiracy against Anaklia.237 In 2018 and 2019,
investigations were opened against Khazaradze, ostensibly to slow down progress in Anaklia and
spook investors.238 In October 2019, Anaklia’s principal US investor backed out of the project.239
Then finally, in January 2020, the Georgian government cancelled ADC’s contract to build a
deep-water port in Anaklia. The official reason was that ADC had failed to secure enough
funding for the project; however, multiple political parties opposing Georgian Dream said that
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the decision was totally political.240 Meanwhile, APM announced just one month later that it was
formally reinitiating the process to obtain permits for port expansion in Poti.241 Knowingly or
otherwise, APM and its parent Maersk are serving as a pawn of Bidzina Ivanishvili and Vladimir
Putin, and contributing to a source of political instability and energy security in Georgia, an
important strategic partner of the West.
These actions came at the same time as the Danish government’s own reorientation
towards greater support of Georgia and Ukraine through its neighborhood policy. In 2011, Lars
Løkke Rasmussen, while addressing the annual meeting of the ambassadors in Copenhagen, said
that economic development aid would continue to be an integral element of Denmark’s active
foreign policy, but that “to ensure that we get the most out of our assistance and make a real
difference, we must also be ready to focus on fewer countries and sectors”.242 This thinking was
on display in 2016 when the foreign ministry released its new neighborhood policy for Eastern
Europe, 2017-21. Previous iterations of the policy had as priority countries Belarus, Ukraine,
Moldova, Armenia, Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The new policy focused only on Georgia and
Ukraine. When asked to comment upon this new policy, foreign minister Anders Samuelsen
explained that “cooperation partners in the neighborhood region have changed since 2005, in that
both country composition, context, necessity, and challenges have also changed”.243 The foreign
ministry had also told Kyiv Post that this was due to budget cuts, but the refocusing of the policy
from a wide range of countries down to the two most threatened by Russia is a clear statement of
intent all the same.244
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The apparent attempt to economically and financially help bolster Ukraine and Georgia
against Russian aggression was at odds with the economic policies towards Russia that Løkke
Rasmussen carried out during his two periods as prime minister from 2009-11 and 2015-19, and
that Helle Thorning-Schmidt upheld as prime minister during the intervening 2011-15 period. As
was discussed earlier, Løkke Rasmussen’s efforts to heal the Danish-Russian bilateral
relationship presented primarily as strengthening commercial ties between the two countries.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen had pitched Denmark’s need for a green revolution as one of increasing
Danish energy security individually and independence of Russian and Middle Eastern energy.
Løkke Rasmussen adapted this green revolution idea away from a political foundation and
towards an economic one. His “green economy” concept focused on developing green
technology as “a massive commercial opportunity”.245 When mentioning volatile energy
suppliers, he either refrained from naming names, or named the Middle East. The 2014 Ukraine
crisis did incite an overall change in his rhetoric, however, when he returned to office in 2015.
Helle Thorning-Schmidt made green growth an even larger component of her energy
policy when she became prime minister in October 2011. Her approach to energy challenges had
a greater focus on social justice, emphasizing inclusive accessibility to clean energy and
highlighting the need for responsibility in national green transitions. Neither geopolitical
concerns nor energy security factored meaningfully into speeches she delivered on the topic of
energy policy. She also took up Løkke Rasmussen’s task of growing trade ties with Russia. In
December 2011, Mariann Fischer Boel was appointed export ambassador to Russia, in
conjunction with the release of the government’s Russia-specific market growth strategy report
in 2012. The report focused on the healthcare and efficient energy sectors as new and promising
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markets in Russia for Danish companies to tap into it, as well as established business networks
there in which dozens of Danish companies are already participants. Objectives of the
government were identified as building relationships with the central decision-makers in Russia
in order support business efforts and advancing the narrative in Russia that Denmark is a green
progressive country.246
However, Helle Thorning-Schmidt was also in office when Russia annexed Crimea and
stoked a civil war in eastern Ukraine. This put her in the position of having to deal with a unique
strain on Danish-Russian economic relations – the sanctions regimes that the EU and Russia
have placed against each other. There were three rounds of Western sanctions, all of which are
still in effect: diplomatic sanctions; visa bans and asset freezes against individuals and
organizations; and economic sanctions against Russia’s financial, defense, and energy sectors.247
Russian countersanctions included an annually renewed ban on Western agricultural food
exports (fruit, vegetables, meat, fish, and dairy). This ban was the one that would most affect
Danish exporters, as Denmark is a large exporter of specifically pork and dairy products and has
historically counted the Russian market for these products as an important one.
There were concerns over how greatly this would affect the Danish agricultural sector,
but the minister of environment and food reported that the drop in food exports had been covered
by an increase in exports to other countries.248 The position of the foreign ministry upon
upholding the EU sanctions regime, in response to skepticism expressed by MP Marie Krarup,
was that “it is of vital interest for a small country like Denmark that there is a rule-bound
international world order, where regulation of states’ behavior is sought through international
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agreements and institutions…the price for letting Russia break international law and order
without consequences will, in the long term, be higher and contribute to greater insecurity”.249
Regarding the energy sector, the American sanctions cover both the Russian gas and oil
sectors; the EU sanctions do not apply to the gas sector because of EU dependence on Russian
gas.250 This means that expansion of the Nord Stream gas pipeline project from northwestern
Russia to northern Germany could continue unhindered. Denmark had approved the permit for
Nord Stream in October 2009. Political support for the pipeline in Denmark at the time had
already been established, in spite of surrounding concerns over the security effects of the
pipeline. Therefore, there was no need to exercise the right of rejection, on any basis, that
Denmark did have available to it due to the pipeline’s passage through Danish territorial waters.
The success of Nord Stream led to the planning, beginning in 2012, of a companion line called
Nord Stream 2. The two pipelines (each is actually comprised of two smaller pipelines, so in
reality there are four) would have the combined capacity to transport 110 billion cubic meters
(bcm) of gas annually. This time, however, the pipeline project lacked the support in Denmark
that the original had enjoyed.
Poland, the Baltic countries, and Ukraine feared Nord Stream because it would, in their
eyes and in their experiences, make Western Europe more dependent upon Russian gas and less
willing to listen to their real concerns about Russia, many of which often had to do with their
own dependence upon Russian gas. These fears were only compounded by the plans for Nord
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Stream 2. The stakeholders in Nord Stream 2 reject these fears of dependency. On their website,
they cite a consumption forecast that sees gas production in the EU dropping by 50% by 2038.251
An increase in imports of Russian gas, they argue, will not increase Europe’s dependency on
Russia, because gas companies will continue to compete in the free market and purchase where
they find the best deal.252 In November 2019, the Director on EU-Russia Cooperation Issues
from the Russian Energy Agency spoke in Copenhagen at the annual Ruslandskonference
(Russia Conference) that is held there by the Danish-Russian Union, supported by the Danish
government. The director, Dr. Teodor Shtilkind, reiterated this argument. He also had a slide in
his presentation dedicated to discussing gas transit through Ukraine.
One of the primary fears, shared by both Ukraine and its partners, is that completion of
Nord Stream 2 will allow Russia to fully cut Ukraine out of its gas transit network. This would
be serious for Ukraine, which earns $3 billion annually from transiting Russian gas.253 Dr.
Shtilkind, sharing the Russian argument against these fears, cited export figures showing that the
amount of gas sent through Ukraine in 2018 “significantly exceeded the total capacity of NS2
and that of the 2nd line of the Turkish Stream project”.254 This is true; NS2 has a capacity of 55
bcm., while the second line of TurkStream has a capacity of 15.75 bcm. The combined total of
approximately 70 bcm. does not cover the 87 bcm. exported through Ukraine in 2018. However,
both lines of TurkStream (the first runs to Turkey, the second to southeastern Europe) have a
combined capacity of 31.5 bcm., and Nord Stream plus Nord Stream 2 have a combined capacity
of 110 bcm.255 This number does exceed the Ukrainian export figures.
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In 2019, 58.5 bcm. of gas was sent through Nord Stream, so even the increased capacity
of Nord Stream 2 would not allow for a hypothetical full redirection of Ukrainian gas transit
through the Baltic pipelines.256 But, between Nord Stream and TurkStream Gazprom still has the
capacity to, at the very least, decrease gas transit through Ukraine, and thereby decrease gas
revenue to Ukraine. Poland also stands to lose gas transit revenue from the completion of Nord
Stream 2 – Eser et. al. estimate that Poland will lose 23% of its gas transit revenue with Nord
Stream 2, while Ukraine will lose 13%.257 They also conclude that “a short-term disruption of
Ukrainian gas flows has only minor operational and financial impacts on the European gas
system”; this does not, however, speak to the impacts on Ukraine.258 This could lay the
conditions for greater effectiveness of Russian influence in Ukraine, such as, for example,
pressuring the Ukrainian government into pro-Russia policies.
The EU is projected to increase gas imports by around 50 bcm. in the coming decade,
according to Dr. Shtilkind. This amount would be covered by Nord Stream 2’s added capacity.
However, the argument that Russia does not stand to gain influence over Western Europe with
these increased deliveries can be countered. Russia does depend on income from Western
European energy consumption, giving it less of an incentive to disrupt gas flows to that market.
However, if Europe’s need for Russian gas is so dire, this arguably gives Russia the advantage in
the relationship. If a political crisis were to strike between Russia and the EU during the cold
winter months, a contraction of gas supplies to Europe would be much more damaging in the
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short term than a contraction of income to Gazprom, especially as it is also actively seeking to
expand its gas delivery capacities to China.259
It is these types of concerns that the young Danish MP Mette Frederiksen (Social
Democrats/Socialdemokratiet, S) likely had in mind when she, in 2017, asked Lars Løkke
Rasmussen to take a broader perspective on Nord Stream 2. “Everyone in this room knows that
energy policy is about more than just energy, and one could say that in the current situation with
Russia’s aggressive behavior…it would of course be problematic to frame a question of Russian
gas and delivery of Russian gas solely as energy policy,” she said, addressing the parliament.
“The question is therefore of whether Denmark is going into this with open eyes…when we had
this discussion many years ago, when the prime minister also had a responsibility, [the
government] chose to use the perspective that this was a purely commercial affair.”260 It is
unclear whether she meant Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s government, which was in charge when
Nord Stream first began to gain traction, or whether she meant Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s earlier
government, which approved the construction permits for Nord Stream; either way, her words
apply. Nord Stream 2 was met with significantly more opposition in Denmark than its
predecessor, because of the previously mentioned concerns. The debate over whether these
concerns are legitimate or not is realistically a political debate with no definitive answer;
however, these were the concerns from the Danish perspective.
The problem was unfortunately one that Mette Frederiksen would herself inherit after
being elected the country’s youngest-ever prime minister in June 2019. The original Nord Stream
pipelines ran through the Danish territorial waters surrounding Bornholm. According to
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international law, a country can reject such a pipeline on any basis, political or security or
environmental, if the plans run through territorial waters. If the plans run through a country’s
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), however, they may only be rejected on the basis that they pose
an environmental hazard. Gazprom, very cognizant of this fact, planned for Nord Stream 2 to run
through Denmark’s EEZ. Originally it was planned for it to follow the route of Nord Stream, and
run alongside Bornholm through Danish territorial waters, but Gazprom had a backup plan when
the first was rejected by the Danes. This took the decision out of Danish hands; Putin recognized
this when he said in early October 2019, “Whether Denmark is able to display independence and
sovereignty depends on the country itself. If it is not prepared to do so, then there are other
routes.”261 The Nord Stream 2 pipelines are planned and built in accordance with the necessary
environmental regulations in the Baltic Sea. This meant that Denmark’s hand was essentially
forced into approving the pipeline, the final approval for which Gazprom had been waiting, in
October 2019.
The governing parties in Denmark were unhappy. “It is not our conviction that we think
the EU should have more gas from Russia. We would rather have avoided this case. In this
concrete case, however, Denmark was obligated under international law to grant permission. It is
a purely administrative decision,” energy minister Dan Jørgensen (S) said of the approval.262
Martin Lidegaard (Radical Left/Radikale Venstre, RV) called it an “unavoidable, but unhappy
decision”, while the Unity List (Enhedslisten, EL) wrote that “Russia should not be rewarded for
its aggressive behavior around the world”.263 However, while a majority of the Danish
parliament opposed Nord Stream 2 as a political issue, not everyone did. The Danish People’s
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Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) had expressed its support for the pipeline in 2018 and still
considered the pipeline to be a purely commercial affair in 2019.264 Whether the pipeline does
turn out to be a purely commercial affair or a geopolitical tinderbox remains to be seen. It was
less than reassuring that, only two weeks after Nord Stream 2’s final permit, Gazprom tried to
negotiate its new gas deal with Ukraine (the existing one would expire at the end of 2019) to
only a one-year deal, indicating a real effort to cut Ukraine out of gas transit as soon as Nord
Stream 2 was fully operational.265 However, in a more hopeful development, Russia and Ukraine
were able to secure a longer five-year deal the following month.
The US primarily opposes the completion of Nord Stream 2 because its completion, and
Russia’s ability to increase its gas sales to Europe, will make it more difficult for the US to
expand its own energy agenda in Western Europe. There are also arguable political reasons for
the US opposition, but these are not uniform and are complicated by the relationship between
Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. The US is seeking to increase its exports of liquefied natural
gas (LNG) to Western Europe; the major issue is that there are prohibitive costs associated with
importing LNG. LNG requires specific infrastructural capacities for an importer to be able to
receive, store, and further distribute the gas. Eser et al. argue that the European pipeline market is
already sufficient to accommodate both the American LNG and Russian Nord Stream 2 import
strategies, with the qualifier that investments need to be made to upgrade the existing
infrastructure to ensure the necessary bidirectionality.266 The completion of Nord Stream 2 is
nonetheless a threat to this American corporate-political business interest.
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Towards that end, in December 2019 the US joined Danish and other European
politicians in linking energy security and gas supplies to defense policy. The American Congress
voted to pass a new defense bill which named Nord Stream 2 “a tool of coercion” and sanctioned
the pipeline, causing Allseas, a Swiss-Dutch company operating in Danish waters, to suspend its
construction activities on the pipeline.267 However, this would only delay, rather than totally
prevent, the completion of Nord Stream 2. At the time of the sanctions, Russia’s energy minister
commented that the completion date would only be pushed back from late 2019 to instead the
end of 2020.268 In addition to Russian anger, the US sanctions also prompted a strong response
from the EU, which hit back against “the imposition of sanctions against EU companies
conducting legitimate business”.269
As late as March 2020, US Senator Ted Cruz was in talks with Ukraine’s national gas
and oil company, Naftogaz, about ways to halt the progress of the pipeline.270 Gazprom still has
several ships available to it that it could make use of to pick up the slack where Allseas was
forced to leave off; however, since the pipe-laying that remains is in Danish waters, and
Denmark has strict laws on the types of ships that may operate in its waters due to the high
number of unexploded bombs on the sea of the Baltic left over from World War II (somewhat
ironically, these are Soviet bombs), there have been delays on approving one or both of
Gazprom’s ships’ ability to continue work in the area. Nord Stream 2 will, by all estimates, be
finished one way or another in 2020 – the primary questions by now simply concern when and
by whom.
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Cultural Relations
Danish Russia expert Flemming Splidsboel Hansen conducted two companion studies,
the first in 2010 and the second in 2018, analyzing the tone of Danish media towards Russia
during the 2000s and 2010s respectively. He found that the top five newspapers in Denmark
(Berlingske, Politiken, BT, Jyllands-Posten, and Ekstrabladet) all had negative outlooks towards
Russia in the 2000s, shaped by Putin’s aggressive centralization of domestic power and
disproportionate use of force in Chechnya; in the 2010s, this trend grew and shifted towards a
narrative in which Denmark and its allies need to protect themselves militarily against Russia’s
aggressive violation of borders.271 Image construction by the media of a given topic can both
influence and be influenced by popular opinion, and in turn these images bleed into pop culture
media.
Literature
Both during the Cold War and following its resolution, Western media has commonly
portrayed Russians, or more generally Eastern Europeans, as villainous characters; Russia often
serves as a mysterious and sometimes nefarious location, rife with former KGB spooks. Despite
the legacy of the Cold War fading somewhat in Western media, Russia remains a source of
inspiration for political thrillers and mystery novels. Denmark is no exception. One of the
country’s most popular writers is Leif Davidsen. Davidsen worked as the Moscow correspondent
for DR (Danmarks Radio) for much of the 1980s and was living in Soviet Russia during the
collapse of communism. These were experiences that he brought into his writing when he began
writing fiction during his time as a correspondent.
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In 1988 he published The Russian Singer, the first of what went on to be known as his
Russian trilogy. A Danish diplomat in Moscow is pulled into the political chaos surrounding the
impending fall of the Soviet Union when one of his embassy coworkers is found dead in an
apartment with a girl from the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. This was likely one of the
earliest and best-known novels that would inform the average Danish thriller-reader of what was
going on across the Baltic; it is therefore worth looking further into what kinds of details this
average Danish reader would be learning, especially because the book was adapted to a film
version in 1993. Davidsen does write sympathetically towards the Russian people – it would be
disingenuous to cast him as a writer who vilifies Russians for the sake of a good story. Arguably,
his sympathy is what causes him to write honestly about what he perceived to be Soviet
government wrongs and societal chaos while he was living in Moscow. He did, however, state in
an interview that when he was unsure of where a character’s ultimate loyalties lay, “That’s fine,
because that’s how it always is in Russia. Double betrayal lies deep in the Russians and in the
power over there.”272
The protagonist Jack Andersen falls in love with Lilli, the sister of the murdered Estonian
girl, and his investigation of the murder, combined with their relationship, endangers Lilli, a
Soviet citizen, with the government. The Russians that he meets all have their own stories of
hardship and experiences with corruption, and they fear the existential failure of their country. At
one point, Jack joins his embassy colleagues in a meeting with the Scandinavia desk at the
Russian foreign ministry; the meeting turns into a lecture by Kamarassov, a Soviet official, about
NATO’s aggressive intentions, Denmark’s need to use its influence and stop preparations for
war, and the island of Bornholm’s exploitation as a springboard for Western aggression against

272

Davidsen qtd. in Bangsgaard 2013.

105

the socialist countries. Jack remarks, “It was hard to take it all seriously when you were seeing
your small country described as an armed military giant that only wishes to wage war against the
socialist countries. If it wasn’t tragic because Kamarassov meant it, it would have been
comical.”273 This echoes a real-life interaction, mentioned in the earlier history and background
chapter, in which Danish diplomat Alex Mørch met with Soviet Marshal Kirill Moskalenko and
noted after the fact that Moskalenko’s conviction that the West was planning an attack on the
Soviet Union revealed him to be depressingly misinformed.274 Andersen also bears witness to the
rise of Pamyat (“Память” in Russian Cyrillic; “Memory” in English), a neo-Nazi ultranationalist
organization in Russia dedicated to the preservation of Russian culture and national-patriotic
Orthodox Christianity.
The Russian Singer, which is the only one of Davidsen’s Russia novels currently
published in English, was followed up by The Last Spy in 1991 and The Innocent Russian in
1993. The Last Spy won the 1991 Golden Laurel (De Gyldne Laurbær) book prize, which is
voted on annually by Danish bookshops and is usually won by a bestseller. The book tells the
story of PET (the police intelligence service) head Jette Jansen’s pursuit of a spy in the Danish
intelligence services and cooperation with a KGB agent to find the spy.275 The Innocent Russian
follows Danish-Armenian Felix Terjosan Jensen to southern Russia, where he has a mysterious
debt to Saddam Hussein to pay; this takes him to an international hotel, where politicians and
mobsters from around the world gather to participate in a black market of former Soviet
goods.276 After this book, Davidsen took a break from writing about Russia for the next decade.
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Another Danish author, Klaus Enghvidt Olsen, also drew on his experiences as a Dane in
a chaotic period of Russian history, this time 1990s Moscow. He was the director of the new
Russian branch of the Danish chewing gum company Dandy (now known as Dansk
Tyggegummi Fabrik, or Danish Chewing Gum Factory), which enjoyed great success in the new
Russian market – chewing gum was widely discouraged in the Soviet Union – and competed
with the American brand Wrigley.277 Twenty years later, Enghvidt Olsen released a collection of
short stories called Russia After The Wall’s Collapse, which he said was based in his “intimate
knowledge of the country’s development, history and culture – and not least of the country’s
residents, for better or for worse”; he had also traveled around the former Soviet Union in the
late ‘80s.278 Enghvidt Olsen’s short story collection takes more of a slice-of-life approach than
Davidsen’s, giving any Danish readers today insight into how their countryman experienced a
tumultuous decade in the East.
Leif Davidsen returned to writing about Russia in 2006, when he released The Unknown
Wife. He described it on the back cover as “a story of disappearance from the new Russia”, in
which a Danish man and his Russian wife take a river cruise through Russia, until her
disappearance in “Putin’s post-communist Russia” causes him to unearth a hidden truth about
her identity.279 Putin became a character, albeit either anonymously or with a different name, in
Davidsen’s Russia novels going forward. In 2013, he released The Accidental Death of the
Patriarch. This novel brought the intrigue of Danish-Russian energy relations home to Danish
readers. The half-Danish, half-Russian Adam Lassen learns that his twin brother Gabriel, who
has been living in Moscow and working for the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church,

277

Varoli 1999.
Enghvidt Olsen 2018.
279
Davidsen 2006.
278

107

Tikhon, has just been found murdered in Moscow. Adam begins to investigate the case on his
own with the help of Masha Kudrina, a Moscow police officer whose brother Sasha Karbanov is
a powerful Russian businessman with close political ties to the Kremlin.
As the truth unravels, Adam learns that Gabriel and his girlfriend’s father had worked
together on researching energy issues. His girlfriend’s father was murdered after he discovered
that the original Nord Stream pipeline had been poorly built and would eventually leak gas out
into the Baltic Sea; the release of this information would ruin Danish-Russian relations and sink
Sasha Karbanov’s hopes of using Denmark and Danish companies to advance Russian pursuit of
Arctic oil and an oil monopoly in Europe. Gabriel is murdered after he brings this information to
Patriarch Tikhon, which also results in the murder of the Patriarch by the FSB. In addition to
wanting to publicize the Nord Stream leak, Tikhon also advocated for the separation of the
Russian Orthodox Church from the Kremlin.280
The president in The Accidental Death of the Patriarch who orders his security services
to murder citizens and religious figures alike is clearly supposed to represent Vladimir Putin. In
an interview, Davidsen said that Patriarch Tikhon was intended to represent Patriarch Alexy II,
who died in December 2008. Davidsen cited rumors he had heard in Moscow that Alexy was
murdered by the Kremlin for his refusal to bless Putin’s war on Georgia several months earlier as
inspiration for the starting point of his novel.281 Although Georgia does not itself feature in this
novel, Davidsen’s characters do often eat at Georgian restaurants. One interesting change in the
broader Danish-Russian relationship that can be tracked through Davidsen’s books is the shift
away from Russian-based exonyms in the Danish language. While many Western languages
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refer to the country as “Georgia”, Slavic-based languages and languages of countries that
historically were in contact with the Russian Empire often use a variant of “Gruzia”, the Russian
name for the country. Since the Rose Revolution, the Georgian government has been actively
trying to influence countries away from using the Russia-influenced terms for its countries and
its people and instead use the Western exonym. In Davidsen’s earlier books, the adjective
“gruziske” is used; in his later books, he uses “georgiske”, and the Danish word used today for
Georgia is “Georgien”. Although it is difficult to locate a source for when this shift took place,
Denmark obviously made a conscious choice to reject Russian influence in the etymology of
some of its neighbors; similarly, Danish government websites have transitioned to using the
Ukrainian “Kyiv” to refer to the country’s capital city, rather than the Russian spelling “Kiev”.
Davidsen’s most recent Russia novel, The Devil in the Hole, was released in 2016 and
similarly draws inspiration from recent events surrounding Russia and fears in Denmark
stemming from those events. It opens in the winter of 2014, as the ousted Ukrainian president
Viktor Yanukovych (unnamed in the book, but unmistakably described) is fleeing his residence
outside of Kyiv after the Euromaidan protests. One of his bodyguards, a half-Danish Russian
nationalist named Tor, is shot in the leg during the evacuation and forced to return to civilian
life. Tor’s father is a former Danish intelligence agent who served undercover in the Soviet
Union, fell in love with a Russian woman, and defected from his country to remain in Russia
with her, in the process abandoning his wife and daughter Laila in Denmark. Now an adult, Laila
learns that her father has intelligence he is trying to sneak out of Russia, prompting her departure
to go see him in Russia and validate his information. As it turns out, the Russian president, also
intended to represent Putin, is planning on invading the Baltic countries. He wants to send
Russians into the Baltics to pose as members of the Russian minorities there who can then claim
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discrimination and raise unrest, thereby giving the Russian state an excuse to invade and defend
its people abroad. Laila’s father asks her to take this information back West so that the assault
can be stopped and World War III can be avoided.282
This is also the first time Laila has heard of the existence of her half-brother Tor, and
their new relationship is a focal point of the book. They have some similarities in their
background: Tor worked for the Russian security services until his injury disqualified him from
service; Laila grew up to be a patriotic Dane who served in the Danish military and deployed to
Iraq, a model citizen of Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s ideal of Denmark as a NATO team player.
Otherwise, the two represent a clash of cultural norms between their countries. Tor works as a
Russian Internet troll, using his Danish language skills learned from his father to work in the
Danish social media sphere and attempt to influence Danish opinions in the direction of proRussia positions. To Laila’s shock, he expresses un-Western values and often makes
homophobic or racist comments, especially directing racial slurs towards people from the
Caucasus region. Although they quickly become close, these cultural differences strain and alter
their new relationship. There is also an incident in the book which, utilizing rather heavy-handed
imagery, sees Laila save Tor from a bear attack on a hunting trip; the bear is a frequently used
symbol of Russia, and the scene does little to advance the plot of the book.
In 2018, a former political employee in the government and later political commentator
for Politiken, Peter Mogensen, also decided to release a Russia-centric thriller. His novel, In the
Bear’s Claws, manages to cover essentially all of the major points of the Danish-Russian
relationship since the 1990s. The protagonist, Henrik Foss, is the foreign affairs spokesman for
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the center-right political party Venstre (Left). A veteran of the Danish military’s Jægerkorps
special forces, he lost his eye in battle with Russian militia forces in Bosnia in the 1990s.
Denmark is overtaking chairmanship of the UN Security Council, just as Chechen independence
is being brought before the Council for a vote. The Russian president Sorokin (again, clearly
representative of Putin) attempts to pressure Denmark into voting no, and the Danish government
fears that Sorokin’s pressure will entail a shutdown of Russian gas to Denmark and to Europe.
Foss and Venstre continue to openly advocate for Chechen independence.283
There is a crisis of confidence among NATO members in Eastern Europe, who see that
the US will put its own concerns above its Article 5 collective defense obligations as a NATO
member; Donald Trump also makes a thinly-veiled appearance in references to an insane,
Russian-installed American president known for using Twitter. Real-life Danish politician Marie
Krarup also makes an anonymous appearance in the book, as a nameless female politician from
the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) who is friendly towards the Russian cause; the
other characters do not suspect her of espionage, but remark that someone else like her could do
it. A Russian-Chechen henchman, Kurtznes, is dispatched to Denmark to terrorize Foss by
kidnapping his ex-wife and children and pressure him into revoking his support for Chechen
independence; also pulled into the drama is a recently-graduated Ph.D. student who wrote her
dissertation on Chechnya and later reveals herself to be a half-Chechen, half-Slovak
granddaughter of Alexander Dubček, the Czechoslovak hero who led the Prague Spring against
Soviet control in 1968. Kurtznes is eventually forced into making a dramatic escape into the
Baltic Sea by submarine, which evokes memories among the characters of the submarine disaster
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(in real life, this was the Kursk disaster of 2000) in which the president allowed hundreds of
Russians to die rather than accept Western help.
So far, the books described here draw heavily (if at times over-exaggeratedly) from
contemporary Russian politics as inspiration for dramatic and suspenseful plots; however, this is
not to say that historical Russian politics do not have a place in the present Danish literary space.
Martin Andersen Nexø, a well-known Danish writer during the twentieth century, lived a
lifetime of controversial events and remains a controversial figure today. Born in 1869, he grew
up on the Danish island of Bornholm, which would later be bombed heavily during the Red
Army’s liberation campaign at the end of World War II, and as a middle-aged man became a
member of the Danish Communist Party (DKP). Nexø became known for the inextricable
linkage of politics and art in his writing, which attained significant popularity in the communist
countries of Eastern Europe. He traveled widely in the Soviet Union, for him the epitome of the
socialist dream, and was present for one of Josef Stalin’s show trials of the political opposition in
the late 1930s; Nexø said the trial (which resulted in the execution of thirteen political
opponents) was carried out “humanely” and with “absolute freedom of speech”.284 When the
Soviet Union invaded Finland and occupied the Baltic countries several years later, he
congratulated the Baltic peoples on their “new freedom” and praised the “peaceful cleansing
action”.285
Some sectors of Danish political thinking regard Martin Andersen Nexø as possessing
“naivety and partial political blindness”.286 However, the so-called proletarian writer is today
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venerated by Danish leftists, who commend his antifascist views (despite his silence when Nazi
Germany occupied Denmark) and advocacy for the proletarian, “which is to say, man himself”,
and regard him as a lens for understanding contemporary political literature.287 Leftist workers’
movements in Denmark celebrated his 150th birthday in 2019 with a large conference in his
name.288 One of his most famous works, Pelle Erobreren (Pelle the Conqueror), was turned into
a film in 1987 that starred Max von Sydow and went on to win an Oscar.
Film and television
The Danish film and TV industries have not had a significant focus on Russia in recent
years, choosing to focus more on the Middle East as a regional setting in light of the War on
Terror and Denmark’s lengthy military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there are
still some releases that are worth mentioning in this context. Danish politics in the 2000s saw a
meaningful revival of the memory of Denmark’s defeat to Germany in 1864 and subsequent loss
of territory. Various politicians, most notably Anders Fogh Rasmussen during his time as prime
minister, invoked this year as a reminder of what happened to Denmark when it isolated itself. In
2014, Denmark’s major public broadcasting service DR produced 1864, the most expensive
Danish TV series to date.
1864 brought to life the horrors of the Second Schleswig War and the pain of losing
Schleswig-Holstein. It also told a parallel story of a Danish family in present-day Denmark,
living with the loss of a son who died serving overseas; it is implied that he was deployed to the
NATO mission in Afghanistan. This was an important series and important to make note of here,
because it brought to the forefront of Danish pop culture twin narratives of what happened when
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Denmark did not have allies to protect it from aggressive neighbors and of what individual
sacrifices these international alliances would entail to keep the country safe.
Also worth mentioning is a Norwegian TV series that began airing in 2015. Its
Norwegian title, Okkupert, is directly translated to Occupied in its English-language release.
Okkupert tells the story of a world in which the US has left NATO, and Norway’s renewable
energy industry has grown so much that it decides to fully cease production of oil and gas. The
EU, currently undergoing an energy crisis, joins forces with Russia to pressure Norway into
restoring gas and oil deliveries to Europe; this pressure takes the form of a de facto political coup
by the Russian government within the Norwegian government and a takeover of Norwegian
energy infrastructure by Russian forces. Investigative journalists are murdered, and Chechen
terrorism comes to Oslo. The series was met with criticism by the Russian embassy in Norway,
which said, “It is really shameful that the writers, in the same year that we are celebrating the
70th anniversary of the victory in World War II, appear to have forgotten the Red Army’s heroic
contribution to the liberation of northern Norway from the Nazi occupiers.”289
The series was sold to DR and aired in Denmark under the name Den russiske
ambassadør, which translates directly to The Russian Ambassador and is quite different from the
Norwegian or English titles. In the wake of the 2014 Ukraine crisis and the resultant international
condemnation of Russia, this title change of a popular and controversial TV series is a relatively
small but nonetheless significant indicator of how Russia was viewed in the Danish
entertainment industry at the time. It also serves to, at least at the outset, effectively put greater
weight on Russia as the aggressor in the narrative, as opposed to the more generalized Occupied
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title which is a less-specific reflection of the EU-orchestrated, EU-sanctioned, and Russiaexecuted occupation that this fictional Norway goes through.
While a fictionalized Russia has not had a large presence on Danish TV screens, the reallife Russia has, markedly more so after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. DR’s popular Horisont
(Horizon) program, akin to the PBS program Frontline, did a feature in 2018 on the resurrection
of Cold War geopolitical dynamics, called “Enemies again?” It opens with an unsettling montage
of Vladimir Putin speaking about Western provocations, cut with footage of Lars Løkke
Rasmussen talking up NATO commitments and Russian aggression. The rest of the 24-minute
feature is split between following the 200 Danish soldiers stationed in Estonia as a NATO
tripwire, and Grigoriy, a former Russian soldier who lives in the forest north of St. Petersburg
and trains children in Yunarmiya, the Russian defense ministry’s youth organization.
Though the two subjects appear rather polar, their words actually show more common
ground than their purposes indicate. “Some say that we have to [be here]. There is a larger
political game. In my head, the politics don’t factor in so much,” a Danish army private with the
nickname Beef tells Horisont. “The threat is so small. I can’t see [a Russian invasion] being the
scenario. If that happened, then we’re really fucked, regardless of however the hell we spin it.”290
Similarly, Grigoriy expresses defensive views of his role: “The most important thing is that they
don’t invade us. What do we want with Europe? What’s so special about Europe? Expansion of
our territory? We have enough to do to secure what we have. Do we have plans to invade another
country? No.”291 However, Horisont still takes the opportunity, as it did in the feature’s
introduction, to do some pointed narrative-framing when depicting soldiers on both sides. At one
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point, Grigoriy and his friends drink and sing a song toasting the memory of Stalin; later, a truck
full of Danish soldiers cheerfully sings a song by Cæsar, a well-known Danish protest singer of
the 1960s.
In August 2000, a Russian submarine called the Kursk exploded underwater while
conducting a naval exercise in the Barents Sea and sank; most of the 118-man crew were killed
immediately. The disaster occurred eight months into Putin’s first term as president; when
Russian rescue efforts located the submarine, they were not adequately equipped to actually
rescue any of the crew, 23 of whom survived the initial disaster but died waiting to be rescued.
The British and Norwegian governments offered rescue help, which was refused by Putin until a
week after the initial accident had occurred. Putin and the Russian navy came under fire for
failing to respond adequately to the disaster.292
Production began in August 2015, exactly fifteen years later, for a film dramatization of
the event. Danish director Martin Zandvliet was originally put in charge of the project, but
control of the project eventually passed to the hands of Thomas Vinterberg, another Danish
director. Vinterberg chose not to include Putin as a character in the film – The Hollywood
Reporter published claims that the production company did so out of fear of retributive Russian
hacking.293 Vinterberg denied this report, calling it “all bullshit” and explaining, “I made the
decision because I think this movie was, first and foremost, about humanity. And I did not want
this movie to reduce itself to become a finger-pointing movie against specific persons…Also, we
do not know how or how much Putin was involved with this.”294 This apolitical approach was a
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somewhat unique one in an entertainment climate that arguably otherwise often politicizes the
onscreen depictions of certain events or figures.
Sports
Sports in the 2010s provided a venue for a clash of cultural norms between Denmark and
Russia. Russia hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics in its Black Sea city of Sochi. In 2013, Russia
passed a law criminalizing the portrayal to minors of non-traditional sexual orientations or
relations, by which was meant non-heterosexual relationships. Denmark, which has one of the
world’s most extensive and progressive track record on protection of LGBTQ rights, openly
criticized the passage of this law. Over ten thousand Danes in Copenhagen protested the law in
front of Christiansborg, which houses the Danish parliament, and then in front of the Russian
embassy.295 There was concern among Danish politicians that homosexual participants and
attendees at the Sochi Olympics would be subject to detainment or harassment by Russian
authorities, but culture minister Marianne Jelved expressed her confidence in the International
Olympic Committee’s ability to protect its athletes, as well as its agreement with Russia that the
law would not affect Olympic participants.296
Denmark has also been critical of the state-sponsored doping by Russian athletes to
enhance their performance in international competitions. The Danish culture ministry expressed
its disappointment that Russia had not been barred from the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de
Janeiro, saying, “It is the Danish government’s opinion that rules are there to be followed – and
regardless of if one is an athlete, support personnel, a country, or a sporting organization, one
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must uphold the anti-doping rules.”297 Russia was later banned in December 2019 from all major
sporting events for the next four years by the World Anti-Doping Agency, a decision that the
Danish government welcomed and supported, as it “followed the line Denmark has had on the
topic of doping for many years”.298
Russia hosted the 2018 FIFA World Cup, for which Denmark qualified. Denmark’s
squad, captained by Simon Kjær and featuring stars such as Kasper Schmeichel and Christian
Eriksen, progressed past the group stages of the tournament and made it to the knockout round of
sixteen. Here, however, Denmark was eliminated by eventual runners-up Croatia in a penalty
shootout. Russia’s hosting of the World Cup was racked by controversies, notably including the
March 2018 poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian intelligence officer who worked with
UK intelligence as a double agent, and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, England. The British
government accused Russia of being behind the attack and announced that it would not send any
diplomatic representatives, as is otherwise customary, to the World Cup.299
Iceland and Sweden joined the diplomatic boycott, although Sweden eventually lifted the
boycott after its squad qualified for the knockout round.300 Denmark did not entertain a
diplomatic boycott of the tournament and was represented by minister of culture Mette Bock and
ambassador to Russia Thomas Winkler.301 Players and fans alike from other countries were
penalized during the World Cup for political celebrations or expressions during matches, some of
which criticized Russian actions in Ukraine; however, the only penalty Danish fans received was
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for throwing beer on Australian fans and displaying a banner that read “Big Boobs” in Danish
during the Denmark-Australia group stage match on 26 June.
Cross-cultural cooperation
In May 2008, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
was established as an agency of the Russian foreign ministry.302 It was then reorganized by
President Medvedev in September 2008, a month after the invasion of Georgia, into the Federal
Agency for the CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation –
this agency is most commonly known as Rossotrudnichestvo. The purpose of this organization is
to maintain Russian cultural influence and soft power in the regions of operation. It has an office
in the heart of Copenhagen, the Russian Center for Knowledge and Culture, which also supports
Russian cultural institutions in the rest of Scandinavia. Per the Center’s website, its mission is
“to profile Russia as a country, promoting the Russian language and culture in Denmark by
conducting various social and cultural activities that give participants a look into Russia’s
modern life, art, music, literature, theater, film, and knowledge”.303 In pursuit of this mission, it
hosts regular film screenings, concerts, and artistic exhibitions that either highlight a Russian
contribution to the field or a Russian-Danish collaboration.
In May 2019 the Center screened the 2007 Russian film Rusalka (Mermaid in English,
Havfrue in Danish).304 Rusalka is a loose modern-day adaptation of The Little Mermaid, one of
the best-known stories by the prolific Danish writer Hans Christian Andersen. In each story, a
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young woman falls in love with a man who loves another. She can either choose to put his
happiness first and allow him to be with his beloved, but at the cost of her own life or happiness,
depending on the story; or, she can prioritize her own happiness, but at the cost of his life or
freedom, again depending on the story. In The Little Mermaid, the mermaid kills herself rather
than disrupt or end the life of the prince she loves. In Rusalka, the protagonist Alice is killed,
freeing her beloved Sasha to be with Rita, the woman he really loves. Alice has a supernatural
ability that causes the fulfillment of her desires; her death, therefore, can be interpreted as her
final wish to allow Sasha to be freed of her influence and to choose Rita. Though the method of
exercising agency differs between the two stories’ protagonists, the intent and outcome are the
same. The widespread popularity of each story in its respective country and adoption of its
themes by the other country speaks to a cultural common ground between Denmark and Russia
that is more frequently lost among the noise of high-level politics and confrontations.

Conclusion and Predictions
Russian-American relations and Russian-EU relations remain the defining frames for
many international issues and conflicts today. Rather than discount the smaller and often
undervalued bilateral relationships contained within these larger relationships, these frames
actually heighten the emphasis that should be placed on these smaller bilateral relationships.
Denmark, despite its small size, has a very strong case for why it should be accorded more
attention and strategic value than it is currently. Its unique positioning, central to both major
avenues of Russia’s energy expansion into both Western Europe and the Arctic, means that the
US, Russia, and any other major actors interested in the development of both European energy
security and Western-Russian relations need to start counting Denmark in.
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Outside of rhetoric, there is no single strategy available for achieving energy security in
both Western and Eastern-Central Europe.305 Denmark occupies the unique space bridging the
energy policies of both regions, and is directly involved in the transit and exploration processes
of Russian energy initiatives in both the Baltic and Arctic regions. In addition to Denmark’s
staunch support of and participation in NATO, this is the primary reason why it needs to be
accorded greater influence and importance by the US, Russia, and other major partners; this is
why in-depth understanding of the Danish-Russian relationship matters. Understanding how the
relationship we see today came to be is crucial to understanding where it can go, and where its
potential for both peaceful cooperation and confrontational flare-ups lie.
In this thesis, I work to establish a map of what fluctuations we have seen take place
between Denmark and Russia over the past thirty years, and which events, trends, and people
prompted these fluctuations. We can use this information when looking ahead at how the
relationship might look in the future. At the time of writing, the world is a few months into the
coronavirus pandemic crisis, which complicates to a degree attempts at forecasting international
relations. Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen has been tasked with responding to a crisis
that has no real precedent in living memory, and her initial measures designed to address the
crisis have been well-received in the country, both politically and publicly. However, significant
steps taken by the government in mid-April 2020, coupled with the long-term uncertainty of the
crisis itself, will have strongly catalyzing effects on Danish politics that, in the future, will
inevitably affect Danish-Russian relations as well.
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If Frederiksen and her government continue to receive approval for their measures to
combat the virus, she will likely be able to build upon this period for future reelection. As a
result of high approval levels, she could experience a boost in self-confidence and assertiveness,
and potentially establish a broader political consensus and base of support. In this scenario, we
are likely to see a stronger Danish government and state, at least in the short term. Combine this
with Frederiksen’s record of opposition to Nord Stream 2, and Putin may find himself looking
across the Baltic at a leader more difficult to push over than either his friend Lars Løkke
Rasmussen or the more distant Helle Thorning-Schmidt.
If Frederiksen is unable to emerge from the coronavirus crisis in a good light, she may
fail in a reelection campaign; there are different consequences to this, depending on the political
orientation and eventual coalition of her successor. Should a centrist prime minister, whether
center-right or center-left, replace Frederiksen, then we can reasonably expect to see a
continuation of the Danish government’s opposition to Russia’s expansion of its energy sector;
though Danish-Russian energy cooperation began and gained traction under Lars Løkke
Rasmussen, a center-right prime minister, he also demonstrated an ability and willingness to
change his position on the topic when presented with it again a decade later.
However, there is already evidence accumulating from around the world, and particularly
in Europe, demonstrating a rise in successful authoritarian practices by opportunistic,
authoritarian leaders who identified political advantages in the health crisis. Leadership in
Poland, Hungary, Turkmenistan, and the United States are examples of growing tendencies
towards greater authoritarianism as a result of the pandemic. If this rightward trend can find a
foothold in Denmark, where the right-wing Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti/DF) has
been one of the country’s largest parties for some years now, and where DF has already had
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success in using the immigration crisis as a springboard, then there is a greater potential for
change in the Danish-Russian relationship. Denmark’s political culture makes the rise of
authoritarianism there unlikely, in my opinion, but DF officials have expressed on record
positions towards Russia and Nord Stream 2 that range from free-market indifference to open
support. The defeat of Mette Frederiksen and the political center in a hypothetical election
coming either during or soon after the coronavirus crisis could possibly lead to more Russiasupportive leadership and open more doors in Europe for Russian energy.
Regardless of what changes occur at the highest level of Danish politics in connection
with the crisis, Denmark may find itself in an advantageous trade position, perhaps with other
trade partners as well but specifically with Russia. Denmark is a large exporter of
pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, and Russia in particular is a large importer of these
supplies from Denmark – this industry was identified as a target for expansion in the Russian
market strategy published by Helle Thorning-Schmidt’s government in 2012. Though the
Russian government entered the global crisis from a position of denial and spent the first quarter
of 2020 reporting suspiciously low numbers of coronavirus cases in tandem with suspiciously
high numbers of pneumonia cases, by mid-April it began to admit that Russia was also suffering
severe damage from the virus.306 As Denmark is set to begin reopening the country earlier than
many of its neighbors in the EU, this could potentially put it in the position to take greater
advantage of regional demand for medical supplies, especially as Russia looks set to experience
even greater upticks in disease cases.
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The spring of 2020 also saw oil prices around the world plummet to devastatingly low
levels; the price per barrel for Russian oil is, as of May 2020, significantly lower than what
Russian oil companies require to break even.307 It is estimated that low prices, reduced demand
for oil in Europe as a result of the coronavirus crisis, and the deep production cut Russia agreed
to, in a nominal truce with Saudi Arabia in the two countries’ oil price war, will lead to the loss
of at least one million jobs in Russia and a huge leap in unemployment.308 These factors may
trigger a recession in Russia and will very likely reduce the amount of energy-based leverage
Russia can wield, at least in the short term, over partners or adversaries in Europe. This may in
turn lead to a significant shift in power dynamics between Russia and Europe, especially
depending on how well major European partners (Germany, for example) are able to insulate
themselves against the global economic downturn.
Denmark is presently poised to reopen its economy, much earlier than its neighbors. If
successful this could lead to a resurgence, albeit a small one, of gas and oil demand from
Denmark, as people regain the ability to move around the country and commute traffic increases
again to its former levels; a successful reopening in Denmark could also potentially prompt other
neighboring countries to reopen sooner, thus returning some of the lost demand for Russian
energy in Europe and placing the onus for cooperation upon Russia.
Political and economic ramifications of the coronavirus are brand-new factors into
international relations forecasts, but the crisis will be, and indeed already is, a defining moment
for politicians and international relationships around the world. Consequently, political results in
the short term will depend in many cases upon political responses to the crisis, and Denmark will
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be no exception. Developments in Danish politics will in turn influence how the country interacts
with Russia. On Russia’s end of things, the short- and long-term effects of the current global
crisis upon its energy industry (specifically oil) and its political leadership, particularly the
support it can ultimately command of the Russian population, will be most meaningful in
dictating both the direction of the country and the trajectory of its relationship towards and with
Denmark.
In the final analysis, however, Russia will in the long-term continue to be victimized by
its geography. The reality of its foreign policy goals, energy policy goals, and national defense
goals all depend upon the reality of its geography; major theaters for all of these goals include
the Arctic and the Baltic Seas. In both cases, Denmark serves as a gatekeeper. The consequence
of this for Russia is that Russia must take greater account of its neighbor across the Baltic,
especially given that each country is pursuing its own respective policy goals, which are often
incompatible with the goals of the other, in one shared space. As long as the relationship between
Russia and Denmark remains contentious and lacking in mutual respect, the relationship and
physical spaces where it plays out will remain a tinderbox quick to spark conflict.
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Appendices
Chronology of Denmark’s governments
PERIOD

PRIME MINISTER

COALITION

3 June 1988 – 18 December 1990

Poul Schlüter III

K-V-RV

18 December 1990 – 25 January 1993

Poul Schlüter IV

K-V

25 January 1993 – 27 September 1994

Poul Nyrup Rasmussen I

S-CD-RV-KD

27 September 1994 – 30 December 1996

Poul Nyrup Rasmussen II

S-CD-RV

30 December 1996 – 23 March 1998

Poul Nyrup Rasmussen III

S-RV

23 March 1998 – 27 November 2001

Poul Nyrup Rasmussen IV

S-RV

27 November 2001 – 18 February 2005

Anders Fogh Rasmussen I

V-K

18 February 2005 – 23 November 2007

Anders Fogh Rasmussen II

V-K

23 November 2007 – 5 April 2009

Anders Fogh Rasmussen III

V-K

5 April 2009 – 3 October 2011

Lars Løkke Rasmussen I

V-K

3 October 2011 – 3 February 2014

Helle Thorning-Schmidt I

S-RV-SF

3 February 2014 – 28 June 2015

Helle Thorning-Schmidt II

S-RV

28 June 2015 – 28 November 2016

Lars Løkke Rasmussen II

V

28 November 2016 – 27 June 2019

Lars Løkke Rasmussen III

V-LA-K

27 June 2019 – present (May 2020)

Mette Frederiksen I

S
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Guide to Danish political parties
(Currently represented in the Danish parliament, as of May 2020)
NAME (Danish)
Socialdemokratiet
Venstre
Dansk Folkeparti
Radikale Venstre
Socialistisk Folkeparti
Enhedslisten
Konservative Folkeparti
Alternativet
Nye Borgerlige
Liberal Alliance
Inuit Ataqatigiit

NAME (English)
Social Democrats
Left
Danish People’s Party
Radical Left
Socialist People’s Party
The Unity List
Conservative People’s Party
The Alternative
New Bourgeois
Liberal Alliance
Community of the People

LETTER
S
V
DF
RV
SF
EL
KF
ALT
D
LA
IA

Siumut

Forward

SIU

Sambandsflokkurin
Javnaðarflokkurin

Unionist Party
Equality Party

SP
JF

Maps
I.

309

Denmark.309

Geology n.d.

IDEOLOGY
Social democracy; center-left
Liberalism; center-right
National conservative; right-wing
Social liberalism; center
Popular socialism; center-left/left-wing
Socialism; left-wing
Conservative; center-right
Green politics; center-left
National conservative; right-wing
Liberalism; center-right
Socialism; left-wing (Greenlandic)
Social democracy; center-left
(Greenlandic)
Liberalism; center-right (Faeroese)
Social democracy; center-left (Faeroese)
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II.

310

Baltic Sea Region.310

The Baltic Times 2019.
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III.

311

Arctic coast countries.311

Geology n.d.
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IV.

Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines.312

V.

Russian gas pipelines to Europe.313
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